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1. INTRODUCTION 
In agricultural economics, 'price stabilization policy' has 
been used to describe two different types of policy. The 
first type are policies which reduce the variability of price 
(e.g., predictable cycles of a price). When there is no 
means for intertemporal resource allocation, a price with 
less variability is preferred unless agents' intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is infinite. A buffer stock 
policy to mitigate fluctuations in grain prices due to 
seasonal weather patterns and production lags is an example 
of this type of policy. The second type are policies which 
decrease price risk. In this thesis, we define risk as a 
function of the difference between an expected value 
conditioned on the producer's information set and a realized 
value. When there are no risk markets, a price with less 
risk is preferred, assuming agents are risk averse. A 
variety of insurance schemes have been used to reduce such 
risk. 
It is difficult to justify or evaluate stabilization 
policies without an equilibrium model since equilibrium is 
the main criterion for judging economic performance. 
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Economic theorists have developed various stabilization 
policy models based on the equilibrium concept. If we group 
equilibrium oriented theorists into two categories: i) the 
first group is composed of early price stabilization 
theorists who viewed stabilization as the elimination of the 
variability of equilibrium (Waugh, 1944 and 1966; Oi, 1961; 
Massell, 1969; Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 1980; Schmitz, 
Shalit and Turnovsky, 1981); ii) the second group features 
micro-economic policy theorists who equated stabilization 
with the minimization of risk^ (Hazell and Scandizzo, 1975; 
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979 and 1981; Gilbert, 1986). 
The first group of economists tried to explain the 
intertemporal variation of price with static^ models. In the 
Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz models (1980 and 1981), it is 
possible that government intervention in the economy can make 
consumers or producers better off. Since they assumed that 
there was no economic instrument to allocate resources 
through time, a government policy which reallocates resources 
through time can make consumers or producers better off. 
The second group of economists argued that price risk 
causes inefficiency when risk markets are not complete and 
the economy fails to achieve a competitive equilibrium. In 
their models a stabilization policy will reduce this 
1. We use the word ^risk' instead of uncertainty since we 
assume an agent in the economy is able to attach 
probabilities to the various possible state of the world. 
2. These models are static in the sense that they do not 
have a means for intertemporal resource allocation. 
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inefficiency by minimizing unexpected changes in prices or 
income. They also used static models so that dynamic aspects 
of the producer's decision making process such as physical 
inventories and financial assets were ignored. 
The purpose of the thesis is to discover how incorporation 
of dynamics into these inherently static models can lead to 
both different results and different interpretations of 
similar results. Many of the static models traditionally 
used to analyze stabilization policies abstract considerably 
from the problems faced by agricultural firms. While many of 
these abstractions provide useful insights, others lead to 
strange and unintuitive conclusions. Static empirical models 
used to evaluate the effects of alternative policies are 
usually based on one or more of these theoretical 
abstractions. To the extent that the static theoretical 
models do not represent the actual decision framework of 
agents in these problems, the results based on these models 
may be questioned. For example, as will be shown in Section 
2.2, the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model (Schmitz, Shalit and 
Turnovsky, 1981) does not have a means for intertemporal 
resource allocation that allows producers to smooth their 
income stream. Consequently, the welfare effects of price 
stabilization policy may be overestimated in the Turnovsky-
Shalit-Schmitz model. The models developed in this thesis 
provide a fairly comprehensive dynamic structure for 
analyzing problems related to price stabilization and should 
4 
prove useful in future research. 
In the thesis we: i) interpret most price stabilization 
policies as government attempts to recover an equilibrium 
that the market fails to achieve; ii) clarify structural 
elements the government should consider in order to implement 
effective stabilization policy through which it can restore 
equilibrium; iii) criticize and extend the basic Waugh-Oi-
Massell model by building ^dynamics' into the model so that 
it reflects the producer's intertemporal optimization 
behavior; iv) criticize conventional supply response models 
used in analyzing markets when risk is important and 
introduce a dynamic rational expectations supply response 
model by which the producer can separate production from 
risk; v) estimate an econometric specification of the 
producer's intertemporal optimization behavior using 
empirical data. 
Table 1 summarizes the analytical models discussed in this 
thesis. In the Waugh-Oi-Massell (WOM) model the prices are 
known to the agents at the time the production decision is 
made although they are not stable through time. This is a 
case of known price variability. Agents in the WOM model 
have a linear utility function and thus are indifferent 
between a fluctuating outcome and a constant outcome. The 
technology is assumed to be the same in each period in this 
model so that production for a given set of inputs always has 
the same expected value. There is no ability to store the 
5 
commodity or financial assets in the model. The model also 
assumes that production is instantaneous. In such a model 
agents are able to observe the price in each period and then 
instantaneously adjust consumption (production) to those 
prices. The Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz (TSS) model is the same 
as the WOM model except that it allows for a concave utility 
function by assuming 'risk averse' agents. Hence, agents in 
this model may prefer constant outcomes to fluctuating 
outcomes. The proposed model of Section 2.4 has a more 
complicated non-linear utility function. The utility 
function has two parameters one for risk attitude, the 
other for intertemporal substitutability. Also it has a 
means for intertemporal resource allocation. In other words, 
it has enough structure so that we can distinguish the 
producer's risk avoiding behavior from income smoothing 
behavior. The model of Section 3.3 allows for both risk and 
non-linear utility. The non-linear utility function 
describes the producer's risk avoiding behavior. The model 
also allows for technological progress. The model of Section 
3.4 is the same as the model of Section 3.3 except that it 
allows storage as a means for intertemporal resource 
allocation. The models of Section 2.4, Section 3.3 and 
Section 3.4 are dynamic since they have a means for 
intertemporal resource allocation. 
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Table 1. Models in the thesis 
Model Price 
Non­
linear 
utility 
Tech­
nological 
progress 
Storage Dynamics 
WOM a Known No No No No 
TSS b Known Yes No No No 
Sec. 2.4 Known Yes No No Yes 
Sec. 3.3 Unknown Yes Yes No Yes 
Sec. 3.4 Unknown Yes Yes Yes Yes 
a. WOM means the Waugh-Oi-Massell model which will be 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
b. TSS means the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model which will be 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
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In Chapter 2 we emphasize the importance of -understanding 
the dynamic or non-dynamic structure of these model. In 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Chapter 2, the static MOM model is 
criticized and reinterpreted in the context of a dynamic 
intertemporal equilibrium. We criticize unintuitive results 
of static models such as: i) producers can lose from a 
stabilization policy (Oi, 1961; Massell, 1969) ; ii) and there 
is 'no risk' but producers can gain (or lose) from a 
stabilization policy because they are 'risk averse' 
(Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 1981) . We show that a model 
with dynamic structure is useful in illuminating these 
unintuitive results. Also, using a dynamic model, we show 
that the goal of a government stabilization policy is the 
restoration of optimum intertemporal resource allocation 
rather than simple elimination of static fluctuation. In 
other words, a price stabilization policy is a government's 
attempt to restore a dynamic intertemporal equilibrium when 
the market fails. However, if producers have a means for 
intertemporal resource allocation there is no need for the 
government to intervene. If no market failure occurs, 
stabilization programs will generate no welfare improvements 
(Spriggs and Van Kooten, 1988). 
In Chapter 3 we emphasize the importance of dynamic 
instruments such as storage or futures markets in supply 
response models. In the proposed model, the producer hedges 
against risk using storage. In Section 3.2, a variety of 
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supply response models are surveyed. In Section 3.3, a 
rational expectations risk elimination policy model is 
discussed. Since stabilization policies change the 
distribution of prices, the parameters of reduced form 
models which depend on the price distribution may be 
inaccurate for assessing the effects of changes in policy. 
This is the substance of ^Lucas critique' (Lucas, 197 6). 
Since a risk elimination policy changes the parameters of the 
model as described in the 'Lucas critique,' we need to know 
the Meep' parameters of the model in order to correctly 
analyze results. In other words, when the parameters of the 
model are changing with the policy, we need to know more 
about the 'primitive' structure of the producer's behavior 
which is invariable to the policy. The effects of the 'deep' 
parameters on the model depend on the structure of the 
market. For example, a 'deep' parameter such as the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion may not influence the 
production decision if there is a means for storage through 
which the producer can absorb the risk. And so in Section 
3.4, we demonstrate that a producer's supply response to the 
stabilization policy depends on the structure of the market. 
In a market which allows the producer to store the products, 
the producer can separate the production decision from risk 
and hedges against risk with storage. Using the separation 
result, we estimate the production technology and the 
producer's risk preferences. Then in Section 3.5, a more 
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complete market model equipped with economic instruments for 
storage is discussed and estimated. In that section we show 
that how the separation of the production decision from risk 
help us to estimate the production technology and the 
producer's preference. Also, using the revealed dynamic 
structure of the model, we estimate the impulse responses of 
other endogenous variables (e.g., price, physical storage and 
assets). Chapter 4 summarizes the thesis. 
There are two major contributions of this thesis. First, 
in Chapter 2, we introduce a new interpretation of the 
Waugh-Oi-Massell model. According to Turnovsky, Shalit and 
Schmitz, the 'unintuitive' result from the Waugh-Oi-Massell 
model (== the producer loses from stabilization policy) arises 
from Waugh-Oi-Massell's linear utility assumption. Hence, 
when the producer's utility function is concave, government 
intervention in the form of a stabilization policy can make 
the producer better off. However, if we see the model from a 
dynamic point of view, the curvature of utility function is 
not interpreted as the measure of risk aversion but the 
measure of intertemporal substitutability and the reason why 
the producer may need government intervention is not because 
the government intervention eliminates fluctuations in the 
economy but because it recovers the dynamic intertemporal 
equilibrium of the economy. In the TSS model, since the 
economy does not have any means for intertemporal resource 
allocation, government intervention helps the economy in 
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achieving dynamic intertemporal equilibrium. However, if we 
allow the producer an appropriate means for intertemporal 
resource allocation, the economy does not need government 
intervention to attain equilibrium. Secondly, in Chapter 3, 
we developed an alternative estimation method for dynamic 
structural supply response models using the separation result 
which separates production decisions from risk. The model 
is structural in the sense that it explicitly contains 
parameters representing agents' preferences and expectations 
are formed endogenously. The model is useful because it 
allows estimation of a variety of structural elements for 
dynamics and risk such as the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, the physical storage loss rate, the producer's 
subjective time discount rate, and technological progress. 
The model can be used for evaluating a variety of policies 
related to price and income stabilization. However, in this 
thesis, we do not use the model for policy analysis since the 
purpose of this thesis is to develop theoretical and 
empirical models that are applicable to a wide range of 
problems. The model can be adapted to investigate specific 
policy issues but that is left for further research. 
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2. MODELS WITHOUT RISK 
2.1. A Review of the Haugh-Ol-Massell and Turnovsky-
Shallt-Schmitz Results 
According to Waugh (1944), consumers lose from a price 
stabilization policy which fixes the price at its mean if the 
source of price instability is random shifts in supply. Oi 
(1961) derivea a similar result for producers. That is, 
producers lose from price stabilization if the source of 
price instability is random shifts in demand. 
Massell (1969) integrated Waugh and Oi's results. Some of 
the important assumptions in Waugh-Oi-Massell are: 
(i) Consumers and producers have linear utility 
functions (i.e., They are risk neutral or their 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
infinite). 
(ii) Consumers and producers make their decisions after 
the price is revealed so that the consumers and 
producers can adjust to the price change with 
certainty, i.e., demand and supply can adjust to 
price changes and there is no risk.3 
3. We allow variability of the price but there is no 
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(iii) demand and supply curves are linear.4 
Some important results of Massell are: 
(*) Producers (consumers) lose from price 
stabilization if the source of price instability is 
random shifts in demand (supply); 
(**) Producers (consumers) gain from the price 
stabilization if the source of price instability is 
random shifts in supply (demand); 
The most shocking is the first result (*), which says that 
one can benefit from price instability. Figure 1 illustrates 
the result. When the demand curve and the supply curve are 
linear and the source of price instability is random shifts 
in demand, producers lose and consumers gain from the 
stabilization policy which stabilizes price at p® by 
stabilizing the fluctuation of demand curve at D®. If we let 
pi _ pe = pe _ p2^ pe = (mean of p^ and p2), Prob(p^) = .5, 
Prob(p2) = .5, then producers' expected gain from the price 
stabilization policy which stabilizes the price at p® is 
-.5(a+b+c) + .5(f+g+h) = -.5b. Therefore the producers 
always lose from the stabilization policy. On the other hand 
consumers are expected to gain .5 (a+b+c+d+e) and lose .5f, so 
riskiness in the utility maximization problem. According to 
Just, Hueth, and Schmitz (1982), this kind of model is 
"stochastic but certain." 
4. Turnovsky (1973) discusses the cases in which demand and 
supply curves are non-linear. Results different than 
Massell's are obtained when demand and supply curves are non­
linear . 
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Figure 1. Gain from stabilization 
that the consumers gain from the stabilization policy. 
Using indirect utility instead of producer's or consumer's 
surplus as a measure of welfare (i.e., using non-linear 
utility instead of linear utility), Turnovsky, Schmitz and 
Shalit (1980, 1981) criticized the Waugh-Oi-Massell model by 
discussing cases in which producers (and consumers) are risk 
averse. The Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model for consumers 
(Turnovsky, Schmitz and Shalit, 1980) is summarized in 
Appendix A. According to them a producer (or a consumer) can 
gain from the stabilization policy when they are 'risk 
averse.' 
However there is really no risk in their model since the 
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price is known when the producer makes the production 
decision. The coefficient of relative risk aversion in their 
model is actually the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in a multi-period model. When Turnovsky-
Shalit-Schmitz assume that the producer is risk averse, they 
are actually assumming that the producer's intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (lES) is less than infinity. A 
less-than-infinity lES means that it is costly in a utility 
sense for the producer to consume outside of the dynamic 
intertemporal equilibrium point. Hence when the producer is 
outside of the dynamic intertemporal equilibrium point and 
his/her lES is less than infinity the producer gains from a 
stabilization policy which makes him/her go back to the 
equilibrium. 
Thus, if we use the concept of the lES, we can explain why 
the producer gains (or loses) from the stabilization policy 
without using concept of risk. But the Waugh-Oi-Massell 
model and the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model could not 
explain the welfare effects of a stabilization policy in the 
context of lES (Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution). 
This is because their models are based on static one period 
optimization so that they cannot accommodate an element of 
dynamic structure such as the lES. Without having an 
appropriate structure, they end up with unintuitive results 
such as: i) Producers can lose from a stabilization policy 
(Oi, 1961; Massell, 1969); ii) Or there is no risk but 
15 
producers can gain (or lose) from a stabilization policy 
because they are risk averse (Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 
1981) . 
The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the Waugh-Oi-
Massell model based on a multi-period optimization problem. 
By doing so we can reinterpret the welfare effects of a 
stabilization policy in the context of the IBS instead of 
risk attitudes. In Section 2.2, a model without any means of 
intertemporal resource allocation is introduced. In Sections 
2.3 and 2.4, a 'dynamic' model is developed. The model is 
'dynamic' in the sense that it is equipped with a means of 
intertemporal resource allocation. Since this model has a 
built-in means of intertemporal resource allocation, it turns 
out that there is no need for government stabilization policy 
to improve producer welfare. 
2.2. A Relnterpretatlon of the Waugh-Oi-Massell Model 
2.2.1. Reconstruction of the Waugh-Oi-Massell model 
In this section we present the traditional Waugh-Oi-Massell 
(WOM) model as a special case of a deterministic 
intertemporal optimization problem in which the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (lES) is assumed to be infinite. 
By presenting the WOM model as a special case of a 
deterministic intertemporal optimization problem, we 
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correctly understand that the curvature in the utility 
function in the WOM model indicates not the producer's 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), but the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (lES). When the IBS 
is infinite only the total amount of consumption is important 
regardless of its intertemporal allocation since it is not 
painful for the producer to substitute one period's 
consumption with another period's consumption. Hence, when 
the lES is infinite, producers cannot gain from a 
stabilization policy which only reallocates consumption 
through time without changing the total amount of 
consumption. 
To make these points clear, consider a simple model. 
Assume that there are only three kinds of goods, an output 
(xt), a fixed input (ft), and a composite good (ct)• The 
physical amount of the fixed input is constant through time. 
The composite good is used in production as a variable input 
as well as for consumption. The output is obtained 
(harvested) at the beginning of every period and there is no 
time lag between planning and production. The producer's 
total wealth in period t is 
(2.1) Wt = ptxt + qtft-l 
where pt is output price at t, xt is the amount of output 
harvested, qt is the price of the fixed input at period t, 
and ft-i is the amount of the fixed input from the previous 
period. The agent's total expenditure in period t is 
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(2.2) Tt = V(xt) + qtft + Ct 
where ct is consumption at t, V(xt) is the variable cost 
function which shows amount of variable input the producer 
uses in period t to produce period t output xt. Assume that 
the input, which is also used as a consumption good, is the 
numeraire so that its price is one. The output price pt is a 
relative price which is the ratio between the price of the 
output and the price of the composite good. Also the amount 
of fixed input is constant over time (ft=ft-l for all t) . 
If we assume the producer has a time-separable utility 
function, the producer's problem is 
(2.3) A1(C1,A2(C2,A3(C3,...))) 
(2.4) s.t. Jtk = Pk'Xk - V(xk), k = 1,2,3,..., 
Xk a 0, Jtk 2 0. 
where Ak(*) is a so-called ^aggregator function" which 
aggregates present utility and future utility (Koopmans, 
1960), and Jtk is the profit at period k. If we assume an 
additively separable utility function such as 
(2.5) Ak (ri,r2)=U(ri)+U(r2) for all k=l,2,... 
where ri and r2 are non-negative real numbers, we can rewrite 
the maximization problem (2.3), (2.4) as 
(2.6) 2 U(%k) 
k=l 
S.t. Jtk = Pk'Xk - V(Xk), for k = 1,2,.... 
Since the utility function is additively separable we can 
solve the problem period by period by maximizing each 
18 
period's utility separately. At period t, in order to 
determine the optimum quantity of production, the producer 
should solve the first order condition 
(2.7) U'(Jtt) {Pt - V'(xt) } = 0 
Then the period t optimum level of the output must be a 
function of pt such that 
(2.8) xt* = X(pt) 
where the asterisk means an optimum value. 
Consequently, the profit is 
(2.9) n(pt) = Pt'Xt* - V(xt*) 
where 11 is the profit function. Then period t utility is 
(2.10) U[II(pt)] = U[pfxt* - V(xt*)]. 
If we expand the utility function around the mean of the 
price, p®, using a Taylor expansion, we obtain 
(2.11) U[II(Pt)] -U[n(pe)] + U'[n(pe) ] •np(pe) . (pt-pe) 
+ ^ {U"[n(pe) ] • [np(pe) ]2 
+ U'[n(pe) ] •npp(pe) } (pt-pe)2. 
We can rewrite (2.11) as 
(2^12) U[n(pt) ] - U[n(pe) ] 
+ U'[n(pe) ] •np(pe) . (pt-pe) 
+ J  U'[n(pe)] [np(pe)]2{ - ^ }(pt-pe)2 
[iip(pG)]^ 
where tp is the curvature of the utility function given by 
U"[n(pe)] 
Ip =3 — 
U'[n(pe)] 
Even though has the same form as the coefficient of 
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'absolute' risk aversion, it is not a measure of risk 
aversion since we do not have any risk in this model. In 
this case ^  is a measure of the intertemporal 
substitutability of income. When a utility function is 
additively separable, the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is the same as the inverse of the coefficient of 
'relative' risk aversion. A higher tj) implies lower 
intertemporal substitutability. In other words, assuming the 
producer has no means for intertemporal resource allocation, 
when tj) is higher it is more costly in a utility sense for the 
producer to consume outside of the 'dynamic intertemporal 
equilibrium' point. By the word 'dynamic intertemporal 
equilibrium,' we mean an equilibrium achieved in a market 
which allows intertemporal resource allocation. Hence the 
higher op is, the more the producer gains from stabilization 
policy which restores the dynamic intertemporal equilibrium. 
Now, if we assume the time series for pt is stationary, the 
average gain of the producer from stabilization, when we 
stabilize the price^ at its mean value p®, is 
12-13) Ti»T2°P<P<=' 
t=l 
T 
• ii» T 2 {-U[n(pt)] + U[n(pe)]} 
t=l 
T 
= tÎ» è 1 {- U'[n(pe) ] .np(pe) . (pt-pG) 
t=l 
^' We are assumming that pt is a stationary process with its 
mean p® and variance Op^. 
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- I U'ClKpS) ] • [np(pe) - Ijj} • (Pt-pG)2} . 
[np(pe)]': 
= - I U'[n(pe) ] • [np(pe) ]2 " 
where Gp(pt) denotes the producer's gain from the 
Hpn(p®) 
stabilization. Hence, if { r - ij)} < (>) 0, the 
[np(p®) ]'^ 
producer gains (loses) from the stabilization policy when we 
stabilize the price at p®. 
If we assume a linear period utility function (i.e., if we 
assume ij) = 0), the producer loses from the stabilization 
policy since npp(p®) > 0 by standard assumptions on the 
production function. If ^  = 0, then lES is infinite. When 
lES is infinite, goods in two different periods in time are 
perfect substitutes for each other. That is, if the amount 
of total goods consumption is the same, the way we allocate 
the amount of goods consumption across time does not matter. 
Hence, when ij) = 0, the government cannot affect the 
producer's utility by just reallocating resources through 
time unless the government changes the total amount of 
resources. This is the same as Waugh-Oi-Massell's result (*) 
which was summarized in the previous section. In the Waugh-
Oi-Massell model in which an infinite lES is assumed, because 
of the convexity of the profit function (i.e., upward sloping 
supply curve), the producer does not prefer stabilized 
prices. Convexity of the profit function means that the 
supply curve is upward sloping so that the producer has 
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flexibility to change the amount of the production when the 
price changes. Hence the producer can take advantage of the 
price change. In other words, the producer can be better off 
by producing more when the price is high and producing less 
when the price is low. 
However, what if the utility function is concave and at the 
same time the profit function is convex? What if the 
stabilization policy allows the producer to enjoy stabilized 
income while it keeps the producer from taking full advantage 
of price fluctuations? Then the welfare effects of a price 
stabilization policy depends on both the curvature of the 
utility function and the profit function. The TSS model 
deals with the case in which the utility function is concave 
at the same time the production function is convex. In the 
TSS model, when convexity of the profit function dominates 
concavity of utility function the producer gains from the 
stabilization policy and when concavity of the utility 
function dominates convexity of the profit function the 
producer loses from the stabilization policy. In Section 
2.2.2 we illustrate the relationship between the welfare 
effects and these curvatures. 
2.2.2. A graphical Interpretation of Waugh-Oi-
Hassell's model 
In this section we will graphically illustrate the 
difference between the Waugh-Oi-Massell model and the 
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Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model. The Waugh-Oi-Massell model 
has a linear utility function and the Turnovsky-Shalit-
Schmitz model has a concave utility function. 
Figure 2 shows the Waugh-Oi-Massell model. In the figure, 
p, Ji, U and X denote price, profit, utility and production 
amount respectively. Note that the supply curve which is 
marked S in the fourth quadrant is not vertical but upward 
sloping. This is because the price is revealed before the 
production decision is actually made so that production can 
respond to the price change. The curves and show 
fluctuation of the demand curve which causes the price 
fluctuation. Curve D® shows the average of the fluctuation. 
P® is the average price. In the first quadrant we show the 
relationship between the price and the profit. Since the 
slope of the supply curve equals the second derivative of the 
profit function we have a convex profit curve in the first 
quadrant. In the second quadrant we show the relationship 
between profit and utility. The 45° line in the second 
quadrant implies that profit (= producer's surplus) is used 
as a measure of utility. In other words, it implies that the 
utility function is linear so that tp = 0. In the third 
quadrant we show the relationship between utility and price. 
Note that the x axis is used for both the production amount 
and price. In the fourth quadrant the x axis denotes the 
production amount but in the third quadrant it denotes price. 
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Figure 2. Waugh-Oi-Massell model 
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In the third quadrant the utility curve is concave. Then 
by Jensen's inequality the utility from the price stabilized 
at its mean (= U®) is less than the average utility without 
the stabilization policy (= U®). That is, the producer loses 
from the stabilization policy. 
In Figure 3 we show that it is possible for the producer to 
gain from the stabilization policy if we use non-linear 
utility (i.e., as in the TSS model, we use indirect utility 
as a measure of the welfare instead of profit assuming the 
lES is less than infinity). In the second quadrant we have 
an indirect utility curve which is concave in profit. In the 
third quadrant we show a concave utility curve for the case 
where the 'concavity of the indirect utility function' (=tj)) 
in the second quadrant dominates the 'convexity of the profit 
npp(p®) Hpp (pG) 
function' (= „ ) in the first quadrant (i.e., { „ r 
[np(pe)] ^ [np(pe)]2 
- Tjj} < 0) . When the utility function in the third quadrant 
is concave the utility from the stabilized price is greater 
than the average utility without the stabilization policy. 
That is, the producer gains from the stabilization policy. 
However, as shown in Figure 4, we can always have an 
opposite result when concavity of the indirect utility 
function in the second quadrant is dominated by convexity of 
the profit function in the first quadrant so that we have a 
concave utility curve in the third quadrant. In that case, 
the producer loses from the stabilization policy. 
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Figure 3. Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model: 
Concavity of utility function dominates 
convexity of profit function 
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Figure 4. Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model : 
Convexity of profit function dominates 
concavity of utility function 
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To sum upf the TSS result is not due to riskiness per se 
but to the concavity of the utility function. In the TSS 
model, there is no risk but certain intertemporal price 
fluctuations. In the TSS model, since the producer has no 
means for intertemporal resource allocation, the producer's 
utility fluctuates when the price of the product fluctuates. 
In Figure 3, the producer's utility from the mean of prices 
p® is greater than the mean of the utilities U(p^) and U(p2) 
so that the producer will choose to smooth fluctuation of the 
price at the level of p® by adjusting his supply of the 
product through time if he has a means for intertemporal 
resource allocation such as storage. In the classical model, 
since the producer has no means for intertemporal resource 
allocation, the government can improve the producer's utility 
by stabilizing the price at p® using a policy instrument such 
as buffer stock. However, when the utility function is not 
concave enough as in Figure 4, the producer's utility from 
the mean of prices p® is smaller than the mean of the 
utilities U(p^) and U(p2) so that the producer will not choose 
to smooth fluctuation of the price at the level of p® even if 
there is a means for intertemporal resource allocation. In 
that case, the government cannot improve the producer's 
utility by stabilizing the price at p®. 
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2.3. Intertemporal Resource Allocation and Stability 
In the previous sections, we discussed models when the 
producer has no means of intertemporal resource allocation. 
In such models a stabilization policy which restore dynamic 
intertemporal equilibrium can have positive effects. But 
what if the producer has a means for intertemporal resource 
allocation? Will the producer still desire a stabilization 
policy? Let us look into the question through a 
deterministic example. 
Assume that the agent has a two-period maximization problem 
represented as 
(2.14) U(ct,ct+i) = (ct« + Ct+l*)l/« 
s.t. ct = s°, Ct+1 = 8°+!, a * 0 
where U(*) is the utility function, Ct is the consumption at 
period t, is the endowment at period t, and a is a 
constant. If a < 1 so that indifference curves of the 
utility function U(') are convex to origin like the ones in 
Figure 5, the agent's utility can be increased by decreasing 
the intertemporal fluctuation of the consumption. 
In Figure 5, the original endowment is 
fluctuating around the equilibrium (Es= s®) ) . In 
S 0 s 0 
other words, s^ > and s^+i < s^+i. If there are means for 
intertemporal resource allocation such as physical inventory 
or a financial asset, the budget set of the problem (2.14) 
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Figure 5. Intertemporal stabilization 
changes from a point to a straight line. In other words, the 
budget constraints of the problem (2.14) (ct = ct+i = 
®t+i^ become ct + = s^ + yY+Yy where i is the interest 
0 , . , ct+i 0 , ^t+i 
rate. In other words, the problem (2.14) becomes 
(2.14)' U(ct,ct+i) = (Ct* + Ct+i«)l/« 
= 0 
Ct+l 0 t+1 
s.t. Ot + - St + -^yTI7 , a » 0 
Then the agent can smooth consumption by moving the 
consumption point toward the expansion path 00'. That is, by 
decreasing consumption by s^-s^ at period t and increasing 
0 s  
consumption by s^+i-St+i at period t+1, the equilibrium can be 
moved up to the higher indifference curve I® from 1°. In the 
previous sections, since there was no instrument for private 
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intertemporal allocation such as financial assets or private 
inventory, the producer with an lES less than infinity could 
gain from a government stabilization policy which reallocates 
consumptions between periods from (s^+i, s°) to s®) . 
Note that if a = 1 so that the lES is infinite, there is no 
way for the producer or the government to enhance the welfare 
by reallocating the supplies since the indifference curves 
(U(ctfCt+i) = ct + ct+i) are straight lines in this case. 
In this example we showed that a producer can 
intertemporally allocate resources in order to maximize 
his/her utility when there is a means for intertemporal 
resource allocation. When individual producer can take care 
of intertemporal resource allocation, there is no need for 
government intervention no matter whether the lES is less 
than infinity or infinity. 
To sum up, the results of the TSS model is a consequence of 
depriving the producer of a means for intertemporal resource 
allocation. Within their static one period optimization 
framework it is impossible to allow the producer a means for 
intertemporal resource allocation. Therefore, in order to 
approach the problem properly we need a dynamic model in 
which intertemporal resource allocation is possible. Also, 
we need a utility function which accommodates both the lES 
and CRRA separately in order to differentiate two different 
problems the intertemporal resource allocation problem and 
the risk problem. For example, consider an additively 
31 
separable utility case in which small CRRA implies big lES. 
In that case, because of the overvalued IBS, we undervalue 
the welfare effects of a stabilization policy which restores 
the dynamic intertemporal equilibrium like Waugh, Oi and 
Massell did in the MOM model. Furthermore, empirically, CRRA 
is probably not the inverse of the lES since we often find 
agents with very small lES and not so big CRRA (Hall, 1988) . 
In the next section we will suggest a model in which: 
i) intertemporal resource allocation is possible; ii) risk 
attitudes and intertemporal substitutability are separately 
included. 
2.4. An Alternative Model 
In the previous section we showed the need for a dynamic 
model in which risk attitudes and intertemporal 
substitutability are separately included. In (2.3)-(2.6), we 
have used an additively separable utility function to 
aggregate utilities of different time periods. However, the 
additively separable utility function which is based on von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (VNM) expected utility framework 
mathematically constrains the CRRA to be the reciprocal of 
the lES (Weil, 1990). See Appendix B for an example. Hence 
the task of separately including risk attitudes and 
intertemporal substitutability in a recursive dynamic model 
is impossible in the time-additive VNM expected utility 
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framework. By abandoning time-additivity, Kihlstrom and 
Mirman (1974) and Selden (1978) separated the CRRA and the 
lES in the VNM expected utility framework. However, the 
models of Kihlstrom and Mirman, and of Selden quickly become 
intractable since they do not have a recursive structure. 
Without the recursive structure it is very difficult for a 
model to be explicitly solved to yield closed-form solutions 
(Farmer, 1990) . 
Kreps and Porteus (1978) established a new axiomatic 
preference framework, sometimes called "non-expected utility" 
in which one can distinguish CRRA and lES without sacrificing 
the recursiveness. Although detailed discussion of the non-
expected utility theory is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
following Epstein (1988), we will demonstrate how to build a 
dynamic recursive utility maximizing problem in which CRRA 
and lES are separated. This model allows a synthesis of the 
WOM, TSS models and some more general results, 
First, assume that, at period t, the producer computes the 
certainty equivalent of future utility, Ft-i, given by 
(2.15) Ft = {EtUt+i®}!/®, if 0 X 8 < 1 
= exp{EtlogUt+i}, if 0 = 0 
where Ut+i is the utility at period t+1. Et is the expectation 
operator conditional on, information available at time t, and 
0 is a risk aversion parameter with the degree of risk 
aversion increasing as 0 decreases. Second, assume that the 
producer combines Ft with current consumption Ct through an 
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aggregator function At such that 
(2.16) Ut = At(ct,Ft). 
If At has the same CES functional form for all t such as 
(2.17) At(ct,Ft) = {ctP + PFtP}l/P, 0 X p < 1 
we can define utility ^recursively' by means of 
(2.18) Ut = {CtP + P(EtUt+i8}P/G}l/P. 
Here, p shows the degree of intertemporal substitution. 
Specifically, 
(2.19) lES = . 
1-p 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate differences between the case in 
p is 1 (= lES is infinity) and the case in which p is not 0 
(= lES is less than infinity). Figure 6 and 7 show two-
period cases in which agents are risk neutral (0=1) and the 
initial endowment is given at point F. In Figures 6 and 7, 
the straight line BB' is the budget line and I^ and 1^ are 
indifference curves. In Figure 6, the indifference curves 
are straight lines since the utility function is Ut(ct,ct+i) = 
Ct + Etct+i. In Figure 6, the budget line BE' completely 
overlaps the indifference curve I® which cross the endowment 
point F. This is because both curves are straight lines and 
slopes of both curves will be the same at the point F. In 
this case, the agent's utility is not changed even though the 
government use a policy which reallocates consumption from 
point F to E, since F and E both are on the same straight-
line indifference curve. In this case, there are no welfare 
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Figure 6. Additively separable utility 
Figure 7. Recursive but not additively separable utility 
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effects of the policy. However, in Figure 7, we have a 
utility function such that Ut(ctfct+i) = {ctP + {EtCt+i}P}l/P. 
Then in spite of the risk neutrality assumption, we still can 
determine the curvature of indifference curves by choosing p. 
When p is less than one, the utility curves are convex to 
origin. In this case, when the agent consumes at a point 
such as F, the government can move up the agent to the 
indifference curve which represents a higher utility level 
than by reallocating the consumption from F to E. The 
point is that, even under the risk neutrality assumption, 
this type of utility function still can reflect the change of 
the agent's utility which is caused by the intertemporal 
resource reallocation. Hence, in this case, we are able to 
correctly evaluate the welfare effects of a government 
stabilization policy which reallocate resources from period 
to period no matter what assumption we pose on the agent's 
risk attitude. 
Assuming that the model is deterministic in order to make 
the calculations brief, we can get rid of the expectation 
operator and the risk aversion parameter. Then (2.18) turns 
into 
(2.20) Ut = {ctP + pUt+iP}l/P. 
Now, allow a one period time lag between production and 
planning. Then we can use production as an instrument for 
intertemporal resource allocation since the production 
transforms period t goods into period t+1 goods. 
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Consequently, ct is defined such that 
(2.21) ct • Pt'Xt - V(xt+i) . 
Note the difference between (2.4) and (2.21). In (2.21) the 
producer pays the production cost one period ahead because of 
the production lag. Now the model is truly dynamic in a 
sense that we have an instrument for intertemporal resource 
allocation. Then from the recursive structure of (2.20) we 
construct the following dynamic programming problem for 
period t-1: 
(2.22) J(Pt-l,xt-i) = "xt • [ct-lP+P{J(Pt.xt) }P]l/P 
ct-l = Pt-l'Xt-l - V(xt) 
where J(') denotes the value function. 
Next, we solve (2.22) using the first order condition and 
the Benveniste-Sheinkman condition (Benveniste and Sheinkman, 
197 9). The first order condition is 
(2.23) Mt_i(l-P)/p.[ct-iP-l + P{j(Pt/Xt) }P-lJ2(Pt,xt) ]=0 
where Mt- i«  [ct - iP+P{J (pt /xt)  }P] ,  and J2(Pt ,xt)  •  -
The Benveniste-Sheinkman condition is 
(2.24) J2(Pt-l,xt-l) = Mt-i(l-P)/P-Ct-iP-l . 
From (2.23) and (2.24) we get 
(2.25) = -P • 
Since 
/9 (dct/dxt) _ Pt 
(gct-i/axt) - \r(xt) ' 
we can rewrite (2.25) such that 
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(2.27) = P 
et V'(xt) 
where ct = Pt'Xt ~ V(x^+i) . The optimal solution (2.27) is a 
second order non-linear difference equation for xt. Equation 
(2.27) implies that the producer takes past production (=xt-i) 
and future production (=xt+i) into account when determining 
the optimum amount of xt. On the other hand, when the lES 
approaches infinity (i.e., p->l), the optimum condition 
implied by (2.27) becomes 
which does not include any other period's production. In 
other words, when the lES is infinity the producer does not 
care about intertemporal resource allocation. 
The model in this section has two parameters one for risk 
attitude, the other for producer's intertemporal utility 
maximizing behavior (=the lES) as well as a means for 
intertemporal resource allocation. The model has an adequate 
structure through which we can distinguish the producer's 
risk avoiding behavior from income smoothing behavior. Also 
the model has a 'complete' dynamic structure in the sense 
that the model not only has a parameter (=the lES) which 
describe incentives for intertemporal resource allocation but 
also has means for intertemporal resource allocation. Hence, 
through the model, we can understand how the producer can 
achieve a dynamic equilibrium through dynamic resource 
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allocation. In this model, there is no need for the 
government to perform intertemporal resource allocation which 
restores the dynamic equilibrium of the economy since the 
producer has ability to achieve the dynamic equilibrium. 
Equation (2.21) shows us that the producer can perform 
dynamic resource allocation by transforming period t input 
into period t+1 output through production process. Equation 
(2.27) explains us how the producer determines the 
dynamically optimum amount of xt by taking past production 
(=xt-i) and future production (=xt+i) into account. 
2.5. Summary 
So far, we have studied various elements which are 
necessary in extending the WOM model into a dynamic model. 
In the first section of the chapter, we began with 
criticizing static models such as the WOM model and TSS 
model. Building dynamic structures into the WOM model and 
the TSS model we reinterpreted their models. There are three 
basic results. Firstly, in the WOM model we do not have any 
means for intertemporal resource allocation but the 
government does not have to intervene in the economy's 
intertemporal resources allocation process for the producer 
since the producer's IBS is infinite. When the lES is 
infinite, only the total amount of consumption is important 
regardless of its intertemporal allocation since it is not 
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painful for the producer to substitute one period's 
consumption with the other period's consumption. Secondly, 
in the TSS model government intervention in the economy's 
intertemporal resource allocation process (= the government 
stabilization policy) can make the producer better off since 
the producer's lES is less than infinity and the producer 
does not have any means for intertemporal resource 
allocation. And finally, if the producer has a means for 
intertemporal allocation, there is no need for the government 
to intervene in the economy no matter whether the producer's 
lES is less than infinity or infinity. 
In Section 2.4 we suggested a model in which not 
only intertemporal resource allocation is possible but also 
risk attitudes and intertemporal substitutability are 
separately included. The model in Section 2.4 is a better 
representation of reality than the WOM or TSS models. It is 
because: i) in the model, we can distinguish two different 
effects of a stabilization policy the effects of risk 
elimination and the effects of income smoothing; ii) we can 
understand how the producer can achieve a dynamic equilibrium 
through dynamic resource allocation. 
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3. MODELS WITH RISK 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, since there was no risk, the role 
of government intervention to the economy was not the 
reduction of risk but optimal intertemporal resource 
reallocation. However, in the previous chapter, when the 
producer had a means for intertemporal resource allocation, 
the need for government intervention in the private 
intertemporal resource allocation process vanished. In this 
chapter we introduce risk into the economy. Now a possible 
role for government intervention exists, unless there is a 
complete set of risk markets. Hence, in this chapter, 
stabilization means risk reduction or elimination. In other 
words, price stabilization policy means a change in the price 
distribution by a government. In agricultural economics, 
since the famous result of Sandmo (1971) which asserts that 
risk can reduce production, the producer's response to risk 
and government stabilization policies has been an important 
issue. For example, Just (1974) concluded that price 
stabilization policy increses production so that the effects 
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of price stabilization policy seriously offset the effects of 
the acreage control policy. 
A number of authors have estimated supply response models 
accounting for risk. These conventional supply response 
models in agriculture generally have been: i) ad hoc in the 
sense that they do not reflect the 'deep' structure of the 
producer's utility maximizing behavior which is invariable to 
policy change.; ii) not usually dynamic in the sense that 
they do not allow a means for intertemporal resource 
allocation such as storage. However, in a rational 
expectations framework, the parameters of the economic model 
depend on the structure of the producer's optimization 
behavior and the distribution of the risk. Also, when 
changing the level of production to reduce risk is more 
difficult than changing the level of storage against risk, 
the producer may attempt to separate the production decision 
from risk and hedge against risk with storage instruments. 
Therefore, there is a need for structural dynamic models to 
address supply response issues in markets where government 
policy may affect the level and variability of prices over 
time. 
The purpose of this chapter is to build a dynamic 
structural model through which we can correctly estimate the 
relationship between the producer's production decision and 
the distribution of risk (=the producer's supply response to 
risk). 
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In Section 3.2, we review conventional supply response 
models. The most common supply response models are ad hoc. 
The problems of an ad hoc model are: i) it does not reflect 
the producer's risk preference; ii) it does not reflect 
market structure through which the producer can spread risk. 
Consequently, in agricultural economics, supply response 
models have not generally incorporated the separation results 
of Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just and 
Schmitz's (1980) which separate the risk averse producer's 
production decision from risk by allowing a market structure 
such as a futures market. 
In Section 3.3, to show how stabilization policy can change 
parameters of the model, we build a rational expectations 
model which has demand side uncertainty. If the parameters 
of the model are variable to the policy change, we need to 
know primitive parameters whose level is so Meep' that the 
policy change cannot penetrate them. For example, we may 
need to know the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in 
order to predict effects of the stabilization policy. In 
Section 3.4 we build a more sophisticated ^dynamic' 
structural model in which storage or hedging is allowed. In 
that section we demonstrate that the producer's response to a 
stabilization policy depends on the structure of the market. 
In a market which allows the producer to store the product or 
to hedge on a futures market, the producer can separate 
production from risk and negotiate risk with storage or a 
43 
futures market. Once production is separated from risk the 
estimation of production technology becomes more simple. 
Though there are many studies (Danthine, 1978; Holthausen, 
1979; Feder, Just and Schmitz, 1980; Hey, 1987; Lence, 1991) 
which show that the existence of futures market leads to 
separation of production decision from risk, few studies show 
that the existence of storage can lead to separation of the 
production decision from risk. This study is useful for an 
economy without futures market such as Korea or for an 
agricultural product which does not have futures market such 
as U.S. rice before 1981. In Section 3.5 we estimate a 
supply response model in which the existence of storage leads 
to separation of production. Using results from the supply 
response estimation, we estimate some structural parameters 
of the model such as the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion, the storage loss rate, and the time discount rate. 
Also, we estimate the impulse responses of physical storage, 
asset holdings and prices to empirically show that physical 
storage works as a buffer which insulates production from 
risk. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Theoretical models 
The Waugh-Oi-Massell and the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz 
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models introduced in the previous chapter are not really 
appropriate for agricultural production analyses since most 
agricultural products are prone to risk. 
Turnovsky, in another work (Turnovsky, 1974), developed a 
linear rational expectations model with risk and analyzed the 
welfare effects of price stabilization policies. In 
Turnovsky's model, risk neutrality (= linearity of the 
utility function) is assumed and risk is introduced in the 
form of an additive disturbance term. Thus, on average, by 
Theil's 'certainty equivalence' (Theil, 1958), the additive 
disturbance term is neutralized and does not make any 
difference in the results of the optimizing behavior. 
Naturally, the results of the WOM model ((*) and (**) in 
Section 2.1) which also do not have risk, coincide with 
results of Turnovsky's model. Usually, linear rational 
expectations models with additive risk terms produce the same 
results as models without risk. 
In his famous paper, using a one-period model, Sandmo 
(1971) showed that a risk averse producer reduces production 
when there is price risk. Note that Sandmo's model is non­
linear since he assumes a risk averse producer. In Sandmo's 
model, the producer's problem is 
(3.1) Max E[U(c) ] 
s.t. c = px-V(x), x > 0. 
where E is a expectation operator, U(-) is the utility 
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function, p is the price, x is the level of production, and 
V(') is a convex cost function. Then the first order 
condition is 
Since the optimum level of x is determined from the first 
order condition (3.2), E[U'(c)] and Cov(U'(c),p) must be 
involved in the production decision process. 
Danthine (1978), Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just and 
Schmitz (1980) showed that if there is an economic 
institution such as a futures market through which the 
producer can spread price risk, the risk averse producer 
separates his/her production from risk. In Holthausen's 
model the producer's problem is 
(3.3) E[U(c) ] 
s.t. c = px+(q-p)f-V(x), X a 0 
where q is the futures market price and f is the amount sold 
in the futures market. Then the first order conditions are 
(3.4) E[U'(c)p] - V'(x)E [U'(c) ] = 0 
(3.5) - E[U'(c)p] + qE[U'(c)] = 0. 
Since these first order conditions are two linear equations 
for the two terms involved with risk (E[U'(c)] and E[U'(c)p]), 
we can eliminate terms E[U'(c)] and E[U'(c)p]. Then we obtain 
(3.6) V'(x) = q. 
This equation (3.6) does not involve any expectations. In 
other words, the producer completely separates his/her 
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production decision from risk. Note that, for this 
separation result, convexity of the cost function V(') is 
necessary. For example, if V(x) is a linear function of x 
such as•V(x)=co+cix, (3.6) becomes ci = q so that we cannot 
decide the optimum production level of x from Equation (3.6). 
3.2.2. Empirical models 
In order to know effects of a stabilization policy for 
producers, we must know the producer's response to the 
stabilization policy. The producer's response is determined 
by both the producer's subjective risk distribution and 
his/her risk preference of producers. 
Studies on supply response to expected price distribution 
are originated with Nerlove (Nerlove, 1958; Askari and 
Cummings, 1976). Nerlove studied supply response to expected 
price. Using an adaptive expectations scheme, Nerlove 
estimated expected price. A typical Nerlovian model is 
(3.7) xt = ao + aipt® + Ct 
where xt is production Et is a disturbance term, and pt® is 
expected price specified as 
(3.8) pt® - Pt-1® = 8(Pt-l - Pt-l®) 
where 0 is a weighting parameter. 
We can rearrange (3.8) as 
CO 
(3.9) pt® = 8 2 (l-8)ipt-i-i-
i=0 
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However, from the theories mentioned above, we know that 
production is affected by price risk as well as the expected 
price. Hence, Just (1974) included a price risk in his 
supply response model 
(3.10) xt = ao + aipt® + a2Pt'^ + Ef 
Here, pt'^ is the price risk term calculated by geometrically 
weighting the lagged squares of deviation from the expected 
price such that 
00 
(3.11) pt^ = (l-X)i(Pt-i-i-Pt-i-iG)2 
1=0 
where X is a weighting parameter. Just applied the model in 
California field-crop data (wheat and sorghum) and concluded 
that risk reduces production, i.e., a2 < 0. Since there are 
many ways to weight distributed lag effects, a variety of 
weighting methods are tried. Lin (1977) used a polynomial 
lag in estimating supply responses of onions and wheat 
respectively. Brorsen, Chavas and Grant (1987) used a three-
year weighted average in estimating the risk term in a model 
of rice supply. The problem with these studies is that the 
measure of riskiness totally depends on an ad hoc weighting 
scheme. 
Recently, using the rational expectations framework in 
which the subjective risk distribution equals an observable 
objective risk distribution, Aradhyula and Holt (1989) 
developed a more dependable method of estimating the risk 
distribution. Aradhyula and Holt's method can be sketched as 
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follows. In order to calculate the risk distribution, they 
use a set of market equilibrium conditions such as 
j3.12) xt = ao + aiPt® + a2Pt^, 
(3.13) yt = bo + bipt - ext, 
(3.14) Xt = yt 
(3.15) pt® = Et_iPt, 
(3.16) pt^ = Et-i(Pt-Et-lPt)^ 
where ext is a exogenous variable with one-period-ahead 
conditional distribution ext~N(0, Oex^)/ Yt is demand in 
period t, and pt is the realized price. From (3.12)-(3.14), 
we obtain 
(3.17) Pt = ^  (ao - bo + aipt® + a2Pt^ + ext) . 
Then we know 
(3.18) pt^ = Et-i (Pt-Et-lPt) ^ Oex^. 
Also, 
(3.19) Pt® = Et-iPt = - ao - ^  Oex^) • 
Substituting (3.18) and (3.19) back into (3.12), we obtain 
(3.20) Xt - ao + (bo - ao - ^  ^ 
- • bi (a?-bi, 
This equation (3.20) shows that xt depends on the 
distribution of the exogenous variable ext. Since RHS of 
Equation (3.20) contains all exogenous variables, we can 
easily estimate Equation (3.20) if we know the distribution 
of ext. However the resulting Equation (3.20) does not show 
the relationship between supply and risk but the relationship 
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between the market equilibrium quantity and risk (=aex^) • 
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, since the supply 
response curve is shifting when risk changes, the 
relationship between the market equilibrium quantity and risk 
is different from the relationship between supply and risk. 
Another interesting study of supply response on risk is 
done by Chavas and Holt (1990). They use a truncated normal 
distribution in deriving the risk term for U.S. corn and 
soybean production equations. Since, in the United States, 
the non-recourse loan rate is applied as a floor price for 
most of major field crops, the distribution of those crop 
prices are truncated from below. Chavas and Holt used a 
three-period weighted average in deriving the risk term. 
The shortcomings of these methods are as follows. First, 
in these models, it is assumed that all parameters are 
invariable to changes of the risk distribution. However, as 
will be shown in the next section, parameters of Equation 
(3.12) are not invariable to the change of risk distribution 
unless we assume risk neutrality of the producer. Secondly, 
the models do not allow any other means to deal with risk 
than adjusting production. If the producer has other means 
to absorb shocks from risk than adjusting production, effects 
of risk on production should be lower. Table 2 shows 
explanatory power of risk in a production equation estimated 
in various supply response models. The table shows that the 
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Table 2. Explanatory power of risk terms 
Model Data 
Risk 
deriva­
tion 
method 
Equation 
Coeffi­
cient of 
risk 
R2 
Just 
(1974) 
California 
field crop 
(1941-70) 
geometric 
lag 
SJVa 
wheat 
-50269.2 
(-1.81 ) C  
.83d 
r . 7 0 i e  
SJV 
sorghum 
-296.6 
(-2.47) 
.95^ 
r . 9 4 1  
Svb 
wheat 
-2193.4 (-
3.96) 
. 8 2 *  
[.67] 
SV 
sorghum 
-183.2 
(-2.89) 
.89d 
r.891 
Lin 
(1977) 
Kansas 
wheat 
(1950-75) 
polynomial 
lag 
lag 
length=3 
-58.98 
(-1.03) 
.8ld 
[.68] 
lag 
length=4 
-95.05 
(-1.84) 
.79^ 
[.68] 
lag 
length=5 
-97.29 
(-1.94) 
.74^ 
[.681 
lag 
length=6 
-99.36 
(-1.92) 
.74^ 
[.681 
lag 
length=7 
-94.86 
(-1.81) 
.75d 
[.68] 
lag 
length=8 
-82.49 
(-1.37) 
.75^ 
[.68] 
Brorsen, 
Chavas & 
Grant 
(1987) 
U.S. rice 
(1950-82) 
3-year 
weighted 
average 
Texas -41.89 
( ? ) E  
Louisiana -4.03 
(-2.21) 
Califor­
nia 
-8.87 
(-1.29) 
Arkansas -26.44 
(-2.56) 
Missis­
sippi 
-1.52 
(-.11) 
a. SJV means San Joaquin Valley. 
b. SV means Sacramento Valley. 
c. In the 0 are t-ratios. 
d. Adjusted R^. 
e. In the [] are adjusted R^ of the equation without risk. 
f. The t-ratio is not reported. 
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Table 2. (continued) 
Aradhyula 
& Holt 
(1989) 
U.S. 
Broiler 
(1967-86) 
Rational 
expecta­
tions 
-2.44 
(-1.39) 
.996 
Chavas & 
Holt 
(1990) 
U.S. corn 
& soybean 
(1954-85) 
3-year 
weighted 
average 
and 
truncated 
norma11tv 
corn 33.59 
(.85) 
.941 
soybean -16.021 
(-2.14) 
.989 
risk term does not always have significant explanatory power. 
That i'Sf the producer does not always adjust production with 
respect to risk. 
On the other hand, studies on producers' risk preference 
have been advanced in various ways. First, experimental 
studies based on survey or interview have been done by Hamal 
and Anderson (1982), King and Robison (1981), Binswanger 
(1980), and Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker (1977). Second, 
Antle (1987) did an econometric study which determines the 
cross section distribution of risk attitudes in a producer 
population. Third, Myers (1989) used aggregated time series 
data and a capital asset pricing model in estimating a 
representative producer's CRRA (Coefficient of Relative Risk 
Aversion) by a maximum likelihood estimation. 
The first and the second studies are not based on a 
structural or dynamic model. Although Myers' model is 
52 
dynamic and structural, like most capital asset pricing 
models, it uses physical inventory as the only choice 
variable of the producer's intertemporal optimization 
process. In other words, it overlooks the possibility that 
production can be used as a means for intertemporal 
resourceallocation when there is a production lag. Since it 
does not have any element which describes the producer's 
production technology, it does not provide basis for 
analyzing the producer's production response to risk. 
Furthermore, it does not have any financial asset. In the 
real world, financial assets as well as the physical 
inventory are used for the producer to deal with risk. 
3.3. A Rational Expectations Model without Storage 
3.3.1. Introduction 
In the previous section we reviewed some of the models 
related to producers' response to risk. One of the problems 
of the ad hoc empirical models is that they assume the 
parameters of the models are invariable to changes in the 
risk distribution. In this section, based on the ^Lucas 
critique,' we will show that parameters of a model are not 
invariable to changes of the risk distribution. 
53 
3.3.2. The model 
As in the previous chapter, let us assume that there are 
only three kinds of goods, an output, a fixed input, and a 
composite good. Also assume the producer does not have any 
means to store value. Agricultural production is prone to 
risk since it takes one period to produce the output so that 
the producer must plan the production before the price is 
revealed. 
The producer's total wealth in period t is 
(3.21) Wt = ptxt + qtft-1 
where pt is output price at t, xt is the amount of output 
harvested, qt is the price of the fixed input in period t, 
and ft-i is the amount of the fixed input from the previous 
period. The producer's total expenditure in period t is 
(3.22) Tt = (l+i)V(xt) + qtft + Ct 
where V(xt) is the amount of variable input used in period 
t-1 to produce period t output xt, i is the real interest 
rate for the borrowed input, and ct is consumption in period 
t. Note that variable input V(xt) is borrowed in period t-1 
and paid back in period t with interest rate i. Then, 
assuming the amount of the fixed input is constant over time 
(ft-i = ft for all t), from (3.21) and (3.22), we know that 
the period t constraint for consumption is 
(3.23) Ct = PtXt - (l+i)V(xt) 
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where Pt is stochastic and uncertain at period t-1. The 
uncertainty of pt is caused by fluctuations of demand. For 
example, in an open economy model, fluctuations of 
international demand often cause fluctuations of price. 
Figure 8 is the schematic diagram of the producer's decision 
process. First, in period t-1 the producer expect the next 
period price pt (=Et-iPt) and decides the production amount 
xt. Second, in period t-1, the producer borrows V(xt) of the 
composite good. Third, through the production process, the 
producer transforms period t-1 input (=V(X(.) ) into period t 
output (=xt) . Fourth, in period t, the producer sells the 
output Xt at the price of pt and pays back V{x^) of the 
composite good with interest iV(xt). Hence, in this case, 
the model is dynamic since the producer can distribute 
resources across time through the production process. 
Now, assume that the producer has additively separable 
utility. Then, at period t-1 the producer wants to maximize 
the objective function 
00 
(3.24) Et_i2) P^U(Ct+j) . 
j=0 
Combining (3.23) and (3.24), the producer's problem at period 
t-1 is 
(3.25) Et.if piu(cttj) 
j=0 
s.t. Ct = Pt^t - (l+i)V(xt), 
Xt > 0 
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C determine Xj. ^ 
according tc 
expected (=Et-iPt > 
/ 
period t-1 
Cdetermine ^ 
according tc 
expected Ft+i(=EtPt+i) 
period t 
+borrow V(xt) 
-prod.cost V(xt) 
-pay back (l+i)V(x^_i) 
+ produce 
Pt-l*t-l - (l+i)V(xt_i) 
\ 
+ borrow V (xt+i) 
- prod. cost V (Xt+i) 
- pay back (l+i)V(x^) 
+ produce Pt^t 
PfcXt - (l+i)V(xt) 
consumption in t-] (=0^-1 ) 1 
consumption in t(=Ct) 
Figure 8. The producer's decision making process 
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Now, assume a CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility 
function such as 
(3.26) U(ct) = -exp [-ilJCt] 
= -expc-ipcptxt-d+i)V(xt) }] 
where ip is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If we 
assume normality of one-period-ahead conditional distribution 
of the price such that Pt~N(Et-iPtrOp^), the expected utility 
is 
(3.27) Et-iU(ct) 
+00 
= - fexp [-tj){ptxt-(l+i) V(xt) } ]exp[-^^^ ]dpt-
OpV2jt J 20p2 
-00 
Following Baron (1970), complete the square in the exponent 
and integrate. Then we obtain 
(3.28) Et-iU(ct) = -exp[-H){Et-iPtXt-(1+i) V(xt) 
-^Op2 (xt) 2} ] . 
Since we know the log transformation does not change 
preference ordering, take log on both sides of (C.3), 
'(3.29) log[Et-iU (Ct) ] = '>l>{Et-iPtXt-( 1+i) V (xt)-•^Op^ (xt) ^. 
Clearly, the maximization of (C.3) is equivalent to the 
maximization of (C.4) and the first order condition for (C.4) 
is 
(3.30) Et-iPt - (l+i)V'(xt) - ipOp^xt = 0. 
Then the first order condition at period t is 
(3.31) Et-iPt - (l+i)V'(xt) - ipap2xt = 0 
where ap2=Vart-l (Pt) and is the coefficient of absolute risk 
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aversion. 
From the first order condition we get the inverse planned 
supply curve of the farmer: 
(3.32) Et-iPt = (l+i)V'(xt) + Ti)Op2xt. 
In Figure 9®, the curve marked Dt is the demand curve at 
period t. The arrows indicate fluctuation on the demand side 
which cause the price risk. The curve marked (l+i)V'(xt) + 
ij)*Op2'Xt is the inverse planned supply curve which is clearly 
on the left hand side of the marginal cost curve marked 
(•l+i)V'(xt) . Note that since we assumed that the price is 
revealed after the production decision is made, the realized 
supply curve, St^ is vertical and it is at the equilibrium 
output level xt®. However, if we have Op^ = 0 in consequence 
of a stabilization policy which stabilizes the price at its 
mean, the curve (l+i)v'(xt) becomes the supply curve and the 
equilibrium supply is xt*. Therefore, stabilization increases 
production. In other words, the parameters of the supply 
curve are not invariable to the policy change (Lucas, 1976) . 
Note that there is no difference between the planned supply 
and the realized supply after the stabilization. 
In Figure 9, as the result of the stabilization policy the 
producer gains the area of waved rectangle and loses the area 
of dotted rectangle. Mathematical calculation of the area is 
in Appendix C. Hence the net welfare effects of the 
6. This figure 8 is based on Professor Harvey Lapan's 
suggestion. However, all remaining errors are mine. 
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(l+i)V(Xt)+ 
Figure 9. Stabilization increases production 
stabilization policy is the difference between area of two 
rectangles. Clearly the sign of the net welfare effect is 
ambiguous. However it is obvious that the smaller the price 
elasticity of demand, the smaller the producer's gain from 
the stabilization policy. This is because when the demand 
curve gets steeper the waved rectangle shrinks and the dotted 
rectangle grows bigger as shown in Figure 10. Intuitively, a 
party with a higher price responsiveness has an advantage in 
a free market economy. Hence, under controlled price a party 
with higher price responsiveness gains less (or loses more). 
In the next section we will examine this variability 
problem more closely through a mathematical analysis. 
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F 
St 
\ 
(l+i)V'(Xt)+t|)Op^Xt 
iPt 
A  (l+i)v'(x 
^ t 
r 
c X 
: 4 
Figure 10. Inelastic demand and the welfare effects 
3.3.3. Variability of model parameters to a policy 
change 
If we assume a quadratic variable cost function such as 
(3.33) V(xt) = - 2dtXt) 
where dt is a coefficient which represent technical progress 
which is 
(3.34) dt = tdt-i for t=l,2,3, . . . 
and dt=do for t=0, the planned inverse supply of the producer 
is 
(3.35) Et-lPt = (l+i)V'(xt) + ' Op2 ' xt 
1+i^ ,1+i . n, 
= - dt + { +ij) ' Op^} Xt. 
7 Y 
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The planned supply is 
1+i 
Y 1 (3.36) xt = T—j dt + T-i Et-iPt-
—+Tl).ap2 ^+tl,-Op2 
Y Y 
According to (3.36) xt decreases when the coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion or the variance of price (= risk) 
increases. Also, note that if the government stabilizes the 
price at Et-iPt (i.e., after the stabilization policy, Op2=0, 
Pt=Et-iPt) or the utility function is linear (ip=0), (3.35) 
becomes 
(3.37) Et-iPt = (l+i)V'(xt) 
1+i , ^ 1+i 
= - dt + Xt. 
Y Y 
Then, 
Y (3.38) Xt = dt + Et-iPt, Pt=Et-iPt. 
Before the stabilization policy, if we estimate a supply 
curve by OLS such as 
(3.3 9) Xt = mo + miEt-iPt 
where mo and mi are regression coefficients, we obtain 
1+i 
(3.40) mo = "^1 = ÏTÏ^ ; ' 
+lp • ap2 +ll) • On^ 
Y Y 
However, after the stabilization policy, we get 
Y (3.41) mo = dt, mi = . 
Since the coefficients (mo, mi) vary with the policy, we 
cannot plan a effective stabilization policy without knowing 
th e  M e e p '  p a r a m e t e r s  s u c h  a s  { y ,  i p ,  d o ,  x }  .  
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For example, Figure 11 shows that, when the risk attitude 
is not neutral, we should be careful in stabilizing the price 
at its expected level E^-iPf It is because as soon as we 
begin the stabilization policy, i.e., as soon as we set Op^ = 
0, the marginal cost curve marked (l+i)V'(xt) becomes the 
supply curve. In other words, the parameters of the supply 
curve are not invariable to the policy. Hence when > 0, 
if we stabilize the price at E^-iPtr the result would be a 
excess supply shown in Figure 11. In particular, when a 
government tries to stabilize the price by a government owned 
buffer stock scheme, the policy should stabilize the price at 
St 
/ 
/ 
(l+i)v'(xt 
excess 
)+ tpOp Xt 
supply 
ipt /( Ax ' (l+i)V(Xt } 
p: ./ s 
X 
Dt 
0 < Xt %t 
Figure 11. Infeasible stabilization policy 
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p*. Otherwise, because of the excess supply shown in Figure 
11, the policy would soon become infeasible. By the same 
reason, if > 0, when a government implements a policy 
which uses a trigger price such as FOR (Farmer Owned 
Reserve), it might be better if the government sets the 
trigger price at p* rather than at E^-iPt • 
So far we have shown that the model parameters are not 
invariable to a policy change. Now we will do a comparative 
statics analysis which shows that a risk averse producer 
reduces production and hence leads to higher price. 
If we think the whole industry as composed of one large 
agricultural firm, then the market supply curve of the 
product is the same as the individual producer's supply curve 
(3.36) . 
(3.42) = Xt. 
If we assume there is one large consumer the demand 
equation which is in the producer's information set is 
(3.43) yt = bo + b^It + b2Pt 
where bg, b^, b2 are coefficients, I^. is the real income such 
that 
(3.44) I^ = 
and P(. is the relative price. Then the total demand is 
(3.45) qt = Yt + et 
where et is stochastic net exports at period t which causes 
the price uncertainty such as 
(3.4 6) et = Çet-i + fit 
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where [it is white noise?. 
Then the farmer with rational expectations can calculate 
the expected price from (3.36), (3.42)-(3.45) and the market 
equilibrium condition 
(3.47) q= = qd. 
That is 
l+i+Yil)Op2 
<3.48) 
l+i+Yij)ap2 
l+i+Y1JKJp2 
" l+iWp2 ' Bt-lSt' 
l+i+Y#Op2 
" i+iwp2 " Set-i' 
where E^-i is an expectation operator conditioned on the 
producer's information set 0^-1 such as 
~ %t-if•• • ; it-if ^t-2• • • f  Pt-i' Pt-2' •••' 
dj./ —1' • • • ' ®t —If •  r  Pf Y' ^f T"f 
bg, b i ,  h 2 ,  i ,  U('), distribution of nt)-
Let us define 
(3.49) Z • bo + biEt-iIt ~ " 7^ Ô + Et-iet. 
l+i+yipOp'^ 
Then, from (3.43), we know Z > 0 since the slope of the 
7. Jit is a white noise if E[(it]=0, Var [(it] =0|x2 < o, 
Gov [Jig, (it ] =0 for all set. 
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demand curve (=b2) is less than zero and the expected price 
Et-lPt is greater than zero and y, ijJ, i, and Op2 are all 
positive numbers. Consequently, 
(3.50, fS g + 
50p2 {Y-b2 (l+i+Y^ap2) }2 
1 (1+i)# ^ 
Y-b2 (l+i+yipap^) l+i+yipOp^ ^ 
> 0 
This is the same result as illustrated in Figure 9. That is, 
the larger Op2, the higher the expected price goes up. 
Also, from (3.46) and (3.48), we know 
(3.51) Op2 = Et-i(pt-Et-lPt)^ 
Y-b2 (l+i+Yipap2) ^ 
Then we can express Op^ as a function of {i, y, i|), b2, 0^2} 
such as 
(3.52) Op2 = J(i, y ,  t|), b2, 0^2) 
So far, in Figures 9 and 10, and Equations (3.36)-(3.41) we 
find that we must know the Meep' parameters of the model in 
order to estimate the welfare effects of the stabilization 
policy when the utility function is non-linear (i.e., ip 0) 
However, if we do not know the explicit solution for the 
distribution of pt, estimation of the structural parameters 
of such a model is difficult, especially when the producer's 
production decision is tangled with risk as shown in (3.36). 
We cannot estimate (3.36) without knowing the distribution of 
Pt. 
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But, in a rational expectations framework, we cannot know 
the distribution of price without estimating (3.36) since the 
distribution of price depends on the supply curve (3.36). In 
other words, since Et-iPt is not observable, in order to 
estimate (3.36), we have to estimate Et-iPt« However, without 
knowing (3.36), it is difficult to estimate Et-iPt • 
In this section, we go around this problem by assuming nt 
is white noise and implementing a linear structure into the 
model. In (3.48) and (3.52), we can get explicit solutions 
for Et-iPt and Op2, since pt is a linear function of Once 
we have explicit solutions for Et-iPt and Op2, it is 
relatively easy to estimate the structural parameters such as 
{Yf . 
Fair and Taylor (1983) studied numerical estimation 
methods for non-linear rational expectations models. They 
used numerical solutions for the expected values in the place 
of explicit analytical solutions for the expected values. 
Holt and Johnson (1989) did a Fair and Taylor (1983) type 
estimation for a rational expectations model with truncated 
normal distribution. This is an obvious alternative to the 
solution proposed above. 
In the next section, we will provide a model in which the 
production decision is separated from risk. 
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3.4. A Model with Storage 
3.4.1. Introduction 
So far we have discussed a way of estimating supply 
response using a rational expectations model. However, under 
rational expectations hypothesis, it is hard to estimate a 
supply resonse model in which production decision is tangled 
with risk. 
As shown in the literature review in Section 3.2, it is 
well known that if we have a futures market the producer 
separates his/her production decision from risk. Once 
production decision is separated from risk we can easily 
estimate the supply response equation even under a rational 
expectations hypothesis. However, in some cases a futures 
market is not available. For example, in Korea, there is no 
futures market for agricultural products and in U.S., there 
was no futures market for rice until 1981. The purpose of 
this section is to investigate possibility of the separation 
result using storage instead of a futures market. 
3.4.2. The model 
Let us assume that there are only three kinds of goods, an 
output, a fixed input, and a composite good. As in the 
previous sections the physical amount of the fixed input is 
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constant through time and the composite good is used as a 
input as well as a consumption good. Furthermore, in this 
section, the output can be stored with appropriate storage 
cost (storage loss). The composite good can be borrowed or 
lent with appropriate interest so that it can be used as a 
financial asset. Then the agent's total revenue in period t 
is 
(3.53) Wt = PtXt + Ptôst-i + (l+i)at-i + qtf 
where Pt is output price in t, xt is the amount of output 
harvested, ô is the storage loss rate, st-i is the amount of 
storage from the previous period, i is the interest rate, at-i 
is the asset from previous period, qt-i is the price of the 
fixed input at period t, and f is the amount of the fixed 
input from period t-1 which is constant over time. The 
agent's total expenditure at period t is 
(3.54) Tt = (l+i)V(xt) + PtSt + at + qtf + ct 
where V(xt) is the amount of variable borrowed and used in 
perion t-1 to produce period t output xt, st is the amount of 
output stored in period t for period t+1, at is the amount of 
financial asset in period t, and ct is consumption at t. 
Figure 12 is the schematic diagram of the producer's 
decision process. First, in period t-1, the producer expects 
the next period price pt (=Et-iPt) and decides how much output 
to produce (=xt), how much output to store (=st-i), and how 
much of the composite good to lend or borrow (=at-i) . Second, 
in period t-1, through the production process, the producer 
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determine «t, 3^.1,3 t-i 
according tc 
^expected (=Et_iPt 
period t-1 
determine 
according tc 
^expected Ft+i(=EtPi:+i)y 
period t 
production 
+ borrow V(xt) 
-prod.cost V(xt) 
-pay back (l+i)V(xt_i) 
+ produce 
+ borrow v (xt+i) ^ 
- prod. cost V (Xt+i) 
-pay back (l+i)V(x^) 
+ produce Pt^t 
physical 
storage 
financial 
asset 
G - store sell Pt-p, - store + sell Pt® P4.Ô8 
G - lend a paid back (l+i) r L at-2j ^- lend 5t paid back (l+i)at 
U) 
Pt-l^t-l - (l+i)V(Xt_i) 
+ Pt-lôSt_2 - Pt-l®t-l 
+ (l+i)at-2 - a^.i 
PfcXt - (l+i)V(Xt) 
+ Pt.ôst_i - P^s^ 
+(l+i)at-i- at 
I 
consumption in t-] (=Ct_i) I 
consumption in t(=Ct) 
Figure 12. The producer's decision making process with 
storage 
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transforms period t-1 input (=V(xt)) into period t output 
(=xt). Third, in period t, the producer sells the produced 
output and the stored output (=xt+ôst-i) at the price of pt 
and pays back V(xt) of the composite good with interest 
iV(xt) . Also the producer is paid back at-i of the composite 
good with interest iat-i. 
The maximization problem of a perfectly competitive 
producer who has an additively separable utility function and 
infinite time horizon at period t-1 is 
(3.55) 
j=0 
s.t. Ct = Pt^t ~ (l+i)V(xt) + 
Pt^st-l - PtSt + (l+i)at-i - at, 
xt > 0 for all t=l, 2 , . . .  
where P is the time discount rate such that 0 < P < 1, Pt is 
the relative price of the good, Xj. is the planned quantity of 
the production at period t. 
The variable cost function is quadratic such that 
(3.56) V(Xt) = —(x^^ - 2dtXt), y  >  0 ,  dt > 0 for all t. 
2 y  
Here, V(xt) can be interpreted as a second order 
approximation of the induced cost function. That is, V(xt) 
is not derived from the producer's optimizing behavior. 
Hence, this model is not completely structural. Here the 
term dj. reflects technological progress such as 
(3.57) dt = Tdt-i. 
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Since V" (X|.) = ~ > 0, we know the variable cost function is 
convex. The convexity of the variable cost function is an 
essential feature of this model. If it is linear so that the 
marginal variable cost does not depend on the level of 
production, we cannot obtain the solution for the optimal 
level of production without involving the expected marginal 
utility. That is, we cannot separate the production decision 
from risk. 
The first order conditions for the period t-1 problem are 
(3.58) xt: Et-i[U'(ct)Pt]-Et-l[U'(ct) ] (l+i)^^^^ = 0 
Y 
(3.59) st-i : PôEt-i [U'(ct)pt]-u'(ct-i)pt-l = 0 
(3.60) at-i : P (1+i) Et-i [U'(ct) ]-U'(ct-i) = 0 
Et_i is an expectation operator conditioned on the producer's 
information set S2t-1 such as 
(3 . 61) f !/•••/ 2'''f Pt—1' Pt— 
1 '  2 '  •  •  •  i  I f  •  •  •  »  '  ^ t - 1 '  •  •  •  '  
at_if at_2f...; Y/ 
bg, hi, b2, i, U('), distribution of gt 
and et}. 
Equation (3.58) shows that the expected gain of marginal 
utility from one unit of output (=Et-i [U'(ct)Pt]) equals the 
expected loss of marginal utility in producing one unit of 
output (=Et-i[U'(ct)](l+i)*^ ^^). Equation (3.59) shows that 
Y 
present value of expected marginal utility from one unit of 
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period t output storage (=PÔEt-i [U'(ct)Ptl ) equals the marginal 
utility from one unit of present output (=U'(ct-i)pt-l) • 
Equation (3.60) shows that present value of expected marginal 
utility of future revenue from lending one unit of the 
composite good (=P(1+i)Et-i [U'(ct)]) equals the marginal 
utility from one unit of the present composite good 
(=U'(ct-i)). 
From (3.58), we obtain 
We can eliminate expectation operators from the Equation 
(3.62) since, through (3.59) and (3.60), the producer can 
adjust st-i so that 
n.63, gt-l[0'(ct)Ptl _ 
Et-l[U'(ct)] Ô 
Then combining (3.62) and (3.63), we have 
(3.64) xt* = dt + Y ^  . 
o 
Equation (3.63) is the arbitrage condition which means there 
is no difference between the revenue from physical storage 
and the revenue from financial asset. Equation (3.64) shows 
the producer's optimal output level. The asterisk means 
optimal solution. Note that the optimal output level 
decision is separated from any stochastic variable and does 
not involve storage. That is, the production decision is 
separated from risk. 
Note that st-i is not constrained to be non-negative which 
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implies the producer can borrow from the future. By not 
assuming the non-negativity condition, we can obtain the 
Equation (3.59). If we assume the non-negativity condition, 
as will be shown in Equation (3.96) later, Equation (3.59) 
changes into a complementarity condition. Since the 
separation result shown in (3.64) is a direct result of 
solving three Equations (3.58)-(3.59), this exclusion of the 
non-negativity condition is important. Though this 
assumption that St-i can in principle be negative is used in 
many studies such as Muth (1961), Massell (1969), Helmberger 
and Weaver (1977), Kawai (1983) and Turnovsky (1983), it is 
physically impossible to make st-i negative for the market as 
a whole. One alternative interpretation is that the producer 
always chooses positive st-i since it is profitable or 
convenient to keep some product at hand. When changing the 
level of production to reduce risk is more difficult than 
changing the level of storage against risk, the producer 
prefers to confront risk with storage. Exploiting the 
advantage of the two storage instruments (financial assets 
and physical inventory), the producer is able to separate 
risk from the production decision. Once the production 
decision is separated from risk, the producer negotiates risk 
with storage. Hence the producer keeps holding inventories 
in order to hedge against risk even though the expected 
future price of the storage is less than the cost of storage. 
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According to Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) this difference 
between the expected future price of the storage and the cost 
of storage is the same as Kaldor's "convenience yield 
(Kaldor, 1939)." 
If we think the whole industry as one large agricultural 
firm, the market supply curve of the product is the same as 
the individual producer's supply curve (3.64) . If there is 
private storage from the last period, st-i, the total supply 
curve of the firm at period t is 
(3.65) q® = Xt* + ôst-i* - St 
where is the private storage demand at t, and ô is the 
storage loss rate. 
On the other hand if we assume there is one large domestic 
consumer the domestic demand is 
(3.66) yt = bo + bilt + b2Pt. 
where bg, b^, b2 are coefficients, p^ is the relative price 
and It is the real income such that 
(3.67) It = ult_i + Git 
where Ejt is a white noise. 
Then the total demand is 
(3.68) qj = Yt + gt " ôgt-i + et 
where gt is the government storage demand at t, and et is 
demand for export. We assume gt and et are forcing variables^ 
and stochastic at t-1. Hence It, gt and et are the sources of 
8. According to Hansen and Sargent (1982) , forcing variables 
are stochastic processes that agents view as being beyond 
their control. 
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the demand side risk. 
Finally, using (3.64)-(3.68) and the market equilibrium 
condition, = q^, we can show that the price is determined 
by a first order difference equation: 
1 Y (3.69) Pt = gg(dt:+ - Pt-l-b0"bllt-(st-ôst-l)-et) • 
To present the problem more clearly, transform the problem 
into a Bellman's equation. Using the Bellman's equation we 
can sketch the problem solving procedure though we do not 
have an explicit solution. Convert (3.55) into a value 
function form such as 
(3.70) J ( ^t-l f St-2, 3-t-2» Pt—If d-t-i) 
= Max {U(ct-i)+PEt-iJ(xt, St-i, at-i, Pt/ dt)}, 
s.t. Ct = Pt(Xt+Egt)-(l+i)V(Xt)+PtÔSt-l-
PtSt+ (1+i) at-i-at 
where J(*) is the value function. Now the control variables 
are {xt, St-i, at-i} . The state variables are {xt-i, st-2, 
St-2/ Pt-lf dt-i}. The transition equation is a vector 
function such as 
•Xt • / -xt-l • 
St-1 St-2 
at-1 = T at-2 
Pt Pt-i 
-dt . I .dt-i . 
From the first order conditions and Benveniste-Scheinkman 
conditions (Benveniste and Scheinkman, 197 9) for the problem 
(3.70) we obtain the same set of necessary conditions as 
(3.58)-(3.60). The first order conditions are: 
75 
(3.72) Xt: pt.^-i9J<''t,St-l,at-l,Pt,dt) ^ 
ÔXt 
(3.73) st-i: -U'(ct-i)Pt-i + PEt-i 
3J(Xt rSt-l/3t-l / Pt rdt) 
5st-i 
=  0 ,  
(3.74) at-i: -U'(ct-i) + PEt-i à J (xfc f st-i f 5t-l f Pt ! dt ) 
9at-i 
= 0 . 
The Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions are: 
dJ (xt-i, st-2f at-2/Pt-lf dt-i) (3.75) xt-i: 
(3.76) st-2 : 
(3.77) at-2: 
ôxt-i 
= U'(ct-i) {pt-i-(l+i)V'(xt_i) }, 
dJ (xt-if St-2^ at-2fPt-1/ dt-i) 
5st-2 
d J  (xt-ir st-2f at-2/Pt-l/dt-i) 
9at-2 
= U'(ct-i)Pt-iô, 
= U' (ct-i) (1+i) . 
Leading (3.75)-(3.77) by one period and substituting those 
back into (3.72)-(3.74), we obtain (3.58)-(3.60). 
Solving the necessary conditions for the control variables 
we get the vector form solution 
(3.78) 
Xt 
st-1* 
Lat-i* J 
= M 
r^t-i 1 
St-2 
at-2 
Pt-i 
-dt-i . 
where M(-) is a vector function. 
Since, from (3.56) and (3.64), we already know the reduced 
form solution for xt* is xt* = Tdt-i + Y , we can separate 
o 
(3.78) into two equations such that 
(3.7 9) Xt* = Tdt-i + Y Pt-i and 
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(3.80) [::: ] = N rxt-i 1 St-2 at-2 
Pt-i 
.dt-i . 
where N(') is a vector function. 
Also, from the market equilibrium condition (3.69), we know 
(3.81) Pt—1 ~ P ( ^t-1 f 2 f Pt—2 f dt—1 fit—If 9t—If 9t—2 ^ ^ t—1 ) • 
Eliminating Sfi by substituting (3.80) into (3.81), we get 
(3.82) Pt-l ~ P ( St-2 f ^ t-2 f Pt-2 f ^ t-1 f ^ t-1 f It—1 f 9t-l f 9t—2 f ®t—1 ) • 
Then, substituting (3.82) back into (3.80), we have the non­
linear vector difference equation 
'St-1* 1 _ 
rst-2 
at-2 
Pt-2 
xt-1 
(3.83) % I = O dt-i 
It-l  
gt-1 
9t-2 
LGt-l 
where 0(*) is a vector function. 
Combining (3.82) and (3.83), 
\ 
/ 
/ •St-2 • 
at-2 
Pt-2 
St-1 • Xt-1 
at-1* = Q dt-i 
Pt-1 . It-l  
9t-l  
gt-2 
\ .et-1 . 
(3.84) 
/ 
where Q { - )  is a vector function. Since, from (3.79), we 
already know that xt-i is a linear combination of dt-i and pt-
2, we eliminate xt-i from the RHS of (3.84) : 
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(3.85) 
st-1 
at-l^ 
LPt-i 
= R 
'St-2 
at-2 
Pt-2 
dt-1 
It-l 
gt-i 
gt-2 
,et-l  J 
\ 
where R(') is a vector function. In (3.85), dt-i, It-if gt-i» 
and et-i are the exogenous forcing variables. We will use 
this equation (3.85) for an impulse response analysis later. 
From the constraint of problem (3.55) we know that cost 
function of physical inventory st-i is linear such that the 
cost of keeping st-i units of physical inventory is (l-ô)st-i. 
In the same way the cost of keeping at-i units of the 
financial asset is also linear such that the cost is (-i)at-i. 
On the other hand, from the second order derivative of the 
cost function, 
(3.86) V"(Xk) = ^  > 0, 
we know the production cost function is convex. To sum up, 
while we should pay the same unit cost for each unit of 
physical inventory or financial asset, we can control the 
unit production cost by adjusting the production amount. 
From the arbitrage condition (3.63), we know that the 
expected price is given by 
(3.87) Et-lPt = (1+i) Pt-.-l covt-i (U' (ct) ,Pt) 
Ô Et-i[U'(ct)] 
That is, the expected price can be less than the marginal 
pt-i 
cost of the physical inventory (= (1+i) "— ) by amount of 
o 
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covt-i  (U' (ct) / Pt) 
: . Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) interpreted 
Et-l[U'(ct)] 
COVt-1 ( u'(ct) f Pt ) 
as the convenience yield of storage. The 
Et-i[u'(ct) ] 
convenience yield can be either negative or positive since 
the sign of covt-i (U'(ct)/Pt) can be either negative or 
dct 
positive. It is because < (>) 0 implies covt-i (U (ct)/Pt) 
dpt 
> (<) 0 since 
(3.88) = U"(ct)^ 
3pt 3pt 
where U"(ct) < 0. 
Then we know that if the expected future price of the 
storage is less than the total cost of storage (i.e., Et-iPt < 
Pt-i -(1 + i)—:—), (=xt+Ost-i-st) should be less than zero. The 
b  d p t  
inequality xt+ôst-i < st means that the producer borrows from 
the future to make the physical storage (i.e., negative 
storage). Since it is physically impossible to make physical 
storage negative for the market as a whole, the expected 
future price of the storage should be greater than the total 
cost of storage. However, most agricultural products show 
positve physical storage yet they show downward trends in 
their relative prices. It is puzzling that why the producers 
keep physical storage even if the expected future price of 
the storage is less than the cost of storage. 
We can separate production from risk using a futures market 
instead of physical storage. If we use a futures market 
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instead of physical storage, the producer's problem is 
00 
(3.89) Et-lS P^"<Ct+j> 
j=0 
s.t. Ct = Pt^t - (l+i)V(xt) + 
(l+i)at-i - at + htot - Pt^t-if 
xt > 0 for all t=l,2,... 
where ht is the futures price and ot is the amount sold in the 
futures market. Then the first order conditions are: 
(3.90) Xt: Et-i[U'(ct)Pt]-Et-i[U'(ct)] (1+i)^^^^^ = 0 
(3.91) at-i: P ( 1+i) Et-i [U'(ct) ]-U'(Cfi) =0 
(3.92) ot-i: PEt-i[U'(ct)Pt]-U'(ct-l)ht-l = 0. 
From (3.90)-(3.92), we can derive a supply curve 
(3.93) Xt* = dt + Y^t-l-
Equation (3.93) shows that the producer can separate the 
production decision from risk when a futures market exists. 
This result is the same as the results of Danthine (1978), 
Holthausen (1979), and Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980). In 
both cases, using a futures market, we can completly 
eliminate risk. 
Now consider a case in which both physical storage and a 
futures market is available. Also assume that physical 
storage in non-negative. The producer's problem is: 
(3.94) xt,st-i,at-i,Ot_i ^t-1 2 (Ct+j) 
j=0 
s.t. Ct = Pt^t - (l+i)V(xt) + 
Ptôst-i - PtSt + (1+i)at-i - at + 
80 
htot - PtOt-lf 
xt > Of St a 0 for all 
Then the first order conditions are: 
(3.95) xt: Et-i[U'(ct)Pt]-Et-l[U'(ct) ] (1+i)^^^^ = 0 
Y 
(3.96) st-i: if PÔEt-i [U'(ct) Pt]-U'(ct-l) Pt-1 = Of st-1 ^ 0 
if PÔEt-i [U'(ct)Pt]-U'(ct-l)Pt-l < 0, st-i = 0 ,  
(3.97) at-i: P (1+i) Et-i [U'(ct) ]-U'(ct-i) =0 
(3.98) ot-i: PEt-i[U'(ct)Pt]-U'(ct-i)ht-i = 0. 
Note that we obtain the complementarity condition (3.96) by 
assuming non-negativity of st-i. In this case, because of the 
existence of the futures market we still can derive the 
separation result in spite of the non-negativity condition 
for st (st & 0 for all t=l,2,...). From (3.95), (3.97) and 
(3.98) we can derive a supply curve that is separated from 
risk : 
(3.99) Xt* = dt + Y^t-l. 
Note that if the expected total revenue from physical storage 
is the same as the total cost for physical storage (i.e., 
PôEt-i [U'(ct) Pt]-U'(ct-i)Pt-l = 0), from (3.96), (3.98) and 
(3.99), we obtain 
(3.100) Xt* = dt + Y 
o 
that is the same result as Equation (3.64). 
In this section, using storage instead of a futures market, 
we have constructed a model which separates production 
behavior from risk. This study is useful for an economy 
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without futures market such as Korea or for an agricultural 
product which does not have futures market such as U.S. rice 
before 1981. Through this study, we can estimate a variety 
of structural elements for dynamics and risk such as the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, the physical storage 
loss rate, the producer's subjective time discount rate, and 
technological progress. In the next section we will estimate 
the model. 
3.5. Estimation of U.S. Rice Market 
3.5.1. Background 
According to Childs and Lin (1989), in the United States, 
rice accounts for about 3-4 percent of food and feed grain 
production. Rice is produced in six States (Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Missouri and California). 
According to the 1982 Census of Agriculture, 11,445 farms 
harvested about 3.2 million acres of rice. The rice area of 
rice farms averaged 282 acres. Almost all the rice area of 
rice farms are irrigated and fertilized. Rice farmers 
planted about 37 percent of their total cropland to rice. 
The average yield in 1982 was 4,710 pounds per acre. At the 
turn of the century, the average yield per acre was 1,144 
pounds. 
Total domestic rice demand is very stable as shown in Table 
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3. Income is more important than price in determining 
domestic food demand for rice. A 5 percent increase in U.S. 
per capita income causes about 3 percent increase in per 
capita food demand of rice. Changes in prices of its 
substitutes (potatoes, corn, and wheat) have almost no effect 
on domestic rice demand. 
Approximately 90 percent of the world's rice is produced in 
Asia. Unlike the U.S. crop, only half of the Asian crop is 
irrigated. Thus, almost 45 percent of the world rice harvest 
depends on the critical timing of Asian monsoon. The United 
States produced about 2 percent of the world rice crop before 
a 30 percent decline in production induced by the PIK 
(Payment In Kind) program in 1983. After the PIK program, 
the United States produced just about 1 percent of the world 
rice crop. However, the U.S. still accounted for about 20 
percent of world exports in 1983. 
The world rice market is volatile and risky because of the 
weather uncertainty (Asian monsoon), the concentration of 
export among a few key countries (Thailand, The United 
States, Burma, Pakistan and China) and the small volume of 
trade (less than 4 percent of world production during 1983-
1987) (Childs and Lin, 1989) . 
Government intervention in the rice market is usually aimed 
at domestic stability. Two major U.S. government programs 
for rice during the sample period (1951-1980) are a 
nonrecourse loan program and marketing quotas. The 
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nonrecourse loan program for rice was initiated in 1941. 
Under the nonrecourse loan program, producers who agree to 
comply with the program provisions may pledge a quantity of a 
commodity as collateral and obtain a loan from the CCC 
(Commodity Credit Corporation). The borrower may choose 
either to repay the loan with interest within a specified 
period and regain control of the collateral commodity or 
default on the loan. In case of a default, the borrower 
forfeits without penalty the collateral commodity to the CCC. 
The loan rate is in Table 3. As shown in the table, the loan 
rate is considerably lower than the market price. During the 
sample period, the loan rate is higher than the market price 
only four times (1951, 1954, 1960, 1975). Marketing quotas 
and acreage allotments program were used during 1955-1973. 
Marketing quotas were operated through acreage allotment. 
Needed production is determined as normal supply less 
beginning stocks. Then needed production is converted to a 
national allotment based on average yield. Once the 
allotment is determined, it is apportioned to farms. All 
production from allotted acreage is eligible for a price 
support program such as the nonrecourse loan program, but 
production from acreage in excess of the allotment is subject 
to penalty. 
We choose to estimate the producer's supply response 
equation and structural parameters (e.g., the coefficient of 
risk aversion, the time discount rate and the storage loss 
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rate) for U.S. rice production since: i) the futures market 
for rice did not exist during the period 1951-1980; ii) in 
the United States, rice has smaller weather-related 
production risk since the entire crop is irrigated and 
fertilized; iii) the risk in the rice market is mainly caused 
by an exogenous demand risk unpredictable export demand 
change (Childs and Lin, 1989). Clearly, these descriptions 
for rice market i), ii) and iii) satisfy the model built in 
the previous section. That is, the model is for a product 
with demand side risk and no production risk and no futures 
market. 
Not many studies have estimated U.S. rice supply. Grant, 
Beach and Lin's (1984) study did not include risk. Grant, 
Richardson, Brorsen and Rister (1984) studied the 
relationship between marketing margins for rice mills and 
rice price variability. Brorsen, Chavas and Grant (1987) 
studied relationship between planted acreage of rice and risk 
but their study used an ad hoc index for risk. According to 
Brorsen, Chavas and Grant, although risk is a statistically 
significant factor which determines acreage planted, the 
largest elasticity of planted acreage w.r.t. risk in absolute 
value is only -.059. 
In this section we will estimate the model from section 3.4 
which has physical inventory, financial assets, and 
technological progress. One advantage of having storage 
instruments (physical inventory and financial asset) is that 
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it makes the estimation of production technology easier by 
separating the production decision from risk. Once the 
production technology is separated from risk, we can easily 
estimate the supply response equation using non-linear least 
squares method. After the supply response equation is 
estimated, we estimate the structural parameters such as the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion, the storage loss rate 
and the time discount rate. 
Estimation methods for structural parameters in stochastic 
dynamic models have been developed by Hansen and Singleton 
(1982) and Rust (1987). Hansen and Singleton's technique is 
based on a method of moment estimation and Rust's technique 
is based on a maximum likelihood estimation. Rust tried a 
'nested fixed point' algorithm for estimating a dynamic 
programming model. Using the algorithm we can estimate 
'primitive parameters' of the producer's utility function. 
Rust's approach is distinguished from traditional approach in 
two aspects: i) the parameter specification occurs at the 
very primitive level so that we can estimate 'deep' 
parameters of the model; ii) the producer's optimization 
algorithm is nested in the 'outer' maximum likelihood 
estimation algorithm. Hansen and Singleton uses the GMM 
(Generalized Methods of Moment) estimator in estimating a 
dynamic structural model. They utilize a property of a 
rational expectations model that the residuals of the first 
order solutions of a dynamic optimization problem must be 
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orthogonal to the variables of the information set used in 
the optimization process. We prefer to use Hansen and 
singleton's method since: i) it does not depends on the 
choice of the distribution since it uses the GMM (Generalized 
Method of Moments) estimators; ii) it uses the instrumental 
variable method so that it does not require explicit form 
solutions for choice variables which are usually very 
difficult to obtain in a non-linear rational expectations 
model. 
In order to show how physical storage responds to a shock 
like a buffer between production and the shock, we estimate 
impulse responses (Sims, 1980) of physical storage, assets 
and price. 
3.5.2. Data 
We use U.S. rice and wheat data from the period 1951-1980. 
Since futures market for rice did not exist during the 
period, the rice data is suitable for our purpose. The rice 
futures market was started in 1981. Wheat data is used for 
comparison purpose even though the futures market for wheat 
is existed during the period. 
The rice data is presented in Table 3. The loan rate is 
the price determined by the nonrecourse loan program. The 
CPI (Consumer Price Index) is calculated based on average 
prices of the consumer goods during 1982-1984. The CPI is 
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Table 3. Rice data 
Real 
Year Price® Private Government Demand^ Produc- Loan Rate® 
(1982-84$) Stockb Stock^ tion^ 
1951 18.54 1800 200 48217 46088 19 .23 
1952 22.07 1500 0 50271 48188 18 .95 
1953 18.40 6700 900 48020 52831 18 .06 
1954 15.80 10000 16700 42256 64184 18 .29 
1955 18.66 7244 27374 47768 55894 17 .39 
1956 18.13 7401 12558 64548 49439 16 .80 
1957 18.36 6157 12012 44610 42934 16 .80 
1958 17.16 6214 9455 45853 44771 15 .50 
1959 15.81 5277 6867 57233 53639 15 .05 
1960 14.90 5948 4132 56594 54597 14 .93 
1961 17.39 5015 314 57468 54201 15 .75 
1962 16.89 5870 1860 63700 66062 15 .60 
1963 16.08 6104 1435 70500 70273 15 .39 
1964 15.71 6633 1044 73500 73190 15 .19 
1965 15.81 7618 621 76400 76292 14 .29 
1966 14.81 8279 232 84800 85014 13 .89 
1967 15.33 6698 86 91100 89379 13 .62 
1968 14.08 10700 5423 94700 104120 13 .22 
1969 14.50 10000 6400 91900 91887 12 .86 
1970 13.94 9167 9467 83100 83817 12 .53 
1971 13.88 8687 2747 94100 85773 12 .52 
1972 17.22 4991 148 92300 85446 12 .61 
1973 34.46 7842 0 90200 92746 13 .67 
1974 23.12 7054 4 113200 112376 15 .29 
1975 15.52 17688 19187 98600 128444 15 .84 
1976 12.34 21780 18721 112100 115642 10 .88 
1977 15.66 16626 10772 112400 99226 10 .21 
1978 12.52 23475 8143 129100 133175 9 .82 
1979 14.46 23781 1891 137900 131945 9 .35 
1980 15.53 16500 0 155600 146159 8 .64 
a. Price per bag (=100 pound). 
b. In 1000 bag. 
c. In base year (1982-84) billion dollar. 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
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Table 3. (continued) 
Consumer 
Real Real Current price Real 
ort^ Interest Financial Price& index income^ 
Rate Assets^ (Current$) (1982- (1982-84$) 
( % )  (1982-84$) 84=100) 
24058 -3.9 0.37 4.82 26.0 1328.2 
25122 2.0 0.48 5.87 26.6 1380.0 
22708 3.4 0.48 4.93 26.8 1435.0 
14280 3.7 0.55 4.25 26.9 1416.2 
18668 4.5 0.52 5.00 26.8 1494.9 
37548 2.8 0.46 4.93 27.2 1525.6 
18325 1.7 0.40 5.16 28.1 1551.1 
19750 2.5 0.34 4.96 28.9 1539.2 
29233 4.7 0.42 4.60 29.1 1629.1 
29474 4.4 0.40 4.41 29.6 1665.3 
29155 4.6 0.41 5.20 29.9 1708.7 
35500 4.6 0.48 5.10 30.2 1799.4 
41800 4.3 0.51 4.92 30.6 1878.3 
42500 4.3 0.51 4.87 31.0 1973.3 
43300 4.0 0.52 4.98 31.5 2087.6 
51600 3.0 0.51 4.80 32.4 2208.3 
56900 2.9 0.54 5.12 33.4 2271.4 
56100 2.7 0.61 4.90 34.8 2365.6 
56900 2.4 0.48 5.32 36.7 2423.3 
46500 3.0 0.43 5.41 38.8 2416.2 
56900 3.5 0.45 5.62 40.5 2484.8 
54000 4.2 0.50 7.20 41.8 2608.5 
49700 1.3 0.80 15.30 44.4 2744.1 
69500 -2.9 0.77 11.40 49.3 2729.3 
56500 -0.4 0.57 8.35 53.8 2695.0 
65600 2.9 0.42 7.02 56. 9 2826.7 
72800 1.9 0.45 9.49 60.6 2958.6 
75700 0.8 0.43 8.16 65.2 3115.2 
82600 -2.2 0.44 10.50 72.6 3192.4 
91400 -3.1 0.56 12.80 82.4 3187.1 
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regarded as the price of the composite goods. Hence the 
relative price of rice is calculated as a ratio between the 
wheat price received by farmers and the CPI. We use the 
average of the Federal Land Bank's real interest rate for new 
loans during 1951-1985 as the interest rate. The Federal 
Land Bank's real interest rate is chosen since it had largest 
share of loans and discounts during the period. Since the 
rice (wheat) producer's financial asset data is not 
available, a proxy variable is used for the rice (wheat) 
producer's financial asset. The proxy is calculated such as 
(3.101) proxy = TEA 
where TEA = (total financial asset of agricultural sector), 
RVP = (value of rice (wheat) production) and TVP = (total 
value of agricultural sector production). Private stock and 
government stock are measured at the end of crop year. The 
rice crop year begins at August 1st and ends at July 31st. 
The wheat crop year begins at June 1st and ends at May 31st. 
Naturally, use of annual data cause a number of timing 
problems. In reality, the storage decision is made 
continuously over the year. However, in the theory, all 
decisions are made at the end of crop year. All physical 
terms are calculated based on crop year. But interest, 
income, price are based on calendar year.9 
9. These kinds of timing problems are not rare. Many of 
estimation models based on capital asset pricing models have 
similar problems. For example, see Myers (1989) and Hansen 
and Singleton (1982). 
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All previously mentioned data as well as other data on 
production, demand, domestic demand, and exports are obtained 
from USDA sources such as "Agricultural Statistics," 
"Rice:Outlook and Situation Report" and "Wheat : Outlook and 
Situation Report." The rice data used is shown in Table 3. 
The wheat data is in Appendix D. 
3.5.3. Estimation method 
Estimation of the Supply response equation 
The first step is the estimation of the supply response 
equation and the technology equation. If we write down these 
equations again to refresh our memory, they are: 
(3.57) dj. = T d^_2, 
(3.64) xt* = dt + Y . 
o 
Define do be the initial value of dt and combine (3.57) and 
(3.64), to obtain 
(3.102) xt* = doxt + TJTpt-i 
Y 
where uj = •-. Using Equation (3.102) we estimate do, x and xn. 
o 
Note that (3.102) is separated from other stochastic decision 
variables and the utility function so that we can estimate 
the technology parameters do and T without knowing the 
distribution of other stochastic variables or the parameters 
of the utility function. We estimate (3.102) by the non­
linear least squares method. The estimation results are 
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summarized in Table 4. 
Estimation of structural parameters 
We assume the constant absolute risk aversion utility 
function 
(3.103) U(ct) = -exp[-\i»ct] 
where is the absolute risk aversion coefficient and 
(3.104) Ct=Pt (xt+Est) - (1+i) V (Xt) +Ptôst-1-Ptst+ ( 1+i) at-l-at • 
Here, remember that 
(3.56) V(xt) = ~(Xt^ - 2dtXt) . 
2Y 
Next, by the generalized instrumental variable estimation 
method of Hansen and Singleton (1982), we estimate the values 
of P, Ô and which satisfy the first order conditions 
(3.58)-(3.60). Two methods are used for the estimation. The 
first is a 'two step' estimation method which directly uses 
the estimated value of dt (d^. = dgit) from the first step in 
the place of dt. The second is an 'one step' method in which 
we estimate do and x along with other parameters p, ô and tp 
using the estimated values of do and r from the first step as 
initial values of do and t. Both methods are based on the 
separation result since both methods are based on the same 
set of first order conditions (3.58)-(3.60). The results 
from the two different methods are shown in Table 4 and 5 
respectively. The RATS program used for the calculation and 
the output of the program are in Appendix E. 
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The estimation process is as follows: 
a. From the first order conditions (3.58)-(3.60), we obtain 
three equations which define the residuals rxtt rst, and rat. 
Those are, 
(3.105) U'(ct) {pt-(l+i)^^^^} -
Y 
Et-l[U'(ct) {pt-(l+i)^^^^}] = rxt 
Y 
(3.106) pôu'(ct)Pt-U'(ct-i)Pt-l -
Et-i [PÔU'(ct)Pt-U'(ct-i)Pt-l] = rst 
(3.107) P(l+i)U'(ct)-U'(ct-i) -
Et-i[P(l+i)U'(ct)-U'(ct-i) ] = rat. 
Here, remember that Et-i [U'(ct) {pt~ (l+i)^^^~^} ] f 
Y 
Et-i [Pôu'(ct)pt-u'(ct-i)pt-i] and Et-i [P ( 1+i) U'(ct)-U'(ct-i) ] are 
all zero since these are the first order conditions. 
b. If the model is correct, the residuals should be 
orthogonal to the variables in the producer's information 
set. Hence we use the variables in the producer's 
information set as the instrumental variables. Then the 
orthogonality condition is 
"rxt • • 
(3.108) E est ® Zt 
rat . 
where E is the unconditional expectation operator, ® is the 
Kronecker product and zt is the vector of instrumental 
variables. 
c. Next, substituting dt (= dox^) for dt, we calculate the 
method of moments estimator such that 
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1 a rxt • (3.109) M(pT/ÔT,lpT) = ^  2 rst 0 Zt 
t=l rat . 
• "rxt • 
rst ® Zt 
rat . 
where T is the sample size. We estimate p, ô and oj) by 
choosing and to make close to zero. 
c'. Or, we can calculate the method of moments estimator 
such that 
1 n (3.110) M(PTfdOT/'ïT) ~ T 2 
t=l 
where T is the sample size. In this case we estimate do and X 
as well as p, ô and by using do and x as initial values for 
do and x respectively. 
d. In the estimation process we use all variables on the 
RHS of (3.78) except dt as the instrumental variables. That 
is, we use {xt-i, St-2» at-2f Pt-l} • Since dt is non-
stationary, it cannot be used as an instrument (Hansen, 
1982). We try lag-lengths from one to four for the 
instrumental variables. The results are shown in Table 5. 
d' . Or, we just estimate do and x as well as p, ô and 
using {xt-i, st-2f at-2f Pt-l) as the instrumental variables. 
Again, we try lag-lengths from one to four for the 
instrumental variables. The results are shown in Table 6.. 
In both the two step method and the one step method, we use 
estimated values of dt in the estimation process. Also note 
that we use the orthogonality conditions instead of using 
explicit solutions for choice variables xt, St-i, and at-i in 
this estimation procedure. A beauty of the instrumental 
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variable method is we do not need an explicit form solution. 
The instrumental variable method uses orthogonality 
conditions instead of explicit form solutions. 
Estimation of impulse responses of the endogenous 
variables 
Due to the separation results, among the four endogenous 
variables (xt, st, a^, Pt) of the system, we have a clear idea 
about the behavior of xt. The behavior of xt is explained by 
the supply response Equation (3.79). Still, behavior of 
other endogenous variables described by Equation (3.85) is 
ambiguous. Now, based on Equation (3.85), we try to linearly 
estimate behavior of the variables st, at, and pt. Following 
Sims' innovation accounting procedure (Sims, 1980), we 
estimate responses of the endogenous variables to shocks. 
First, we set up a set of linear auto-regressive equations 
for the VAR (Vector Autoregressions) estimation such as 
(3.111) St = rso+rsddumt+rsiSt-i+rs2at-i+rs3Pt-i 
+rs4dt+r35lt+rs6gt+rs7gt-i+rg8et+est 
(3.112) at = raO+radCiumt+raiSt-i+ra2at-l+ra3Pt-l 
+ra4dt+ra5lt+ra6gt+ra7gt-l+ra8et+Eat 
(3.113) Pt == rpo+rpddumt+rpiSt-i+rp2St-i+rp3Pt-i 
+rp4dt+rp5lt+rpggt+rp7gt-i+rp8et+Ept 
where rgo, rgo and rpo are constants; dumt is a dummy variable 
for the oil shock of year 1973; dt, Itf gt/ and et are 
exogenous variables; and Egt, Eat and Ept are white noises. 
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Secondly, we convert Equations (3.106)- (3 .108) into moving 
average forms. Then 
(3.114) 
St 
at 
Pt 
= A(L) 
• 1  
duitit 
dt 
It 
9t 
9t-l 
•et 
+ B(L) 
est 
Gat 
.®pt . 
+ AjL] + 
+ BjL] + 
where A(L) and B(L) are matrices of polynomials in the lag 
operator with dimentions 3x7 and 3x3 respectively. That is, 
(3.115) A(L) = Ao + AiL + • 
B(L) = Bq + B^L + 
where L is a lag operators, Aj is a 3x7 matrix, Bj is a 3x3 
matrix. 
Secondly, using the results from the OLS estimation, we 
calculate forecast error variances. Since these three 
variances are not contemporaneously independent each other, 
using the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process, we 
decompose these errors into three orthogonal error processes: 
a) Choose an error term of an endogenous variable (say, 
Est) • 
b) Pick another error term (say, Ept) and regress it on Est. 
Name the residual of the regression EEpt. By construction, 
EEpt is orthogonal to Egf 
c) Repeat the same regression procedure for Eat using both 
Egt and EEpt as independent variables and name the residual 
EEaf Then EEat is orthogonal to both Egt and EEpt. 
d) Normalize the variances of these three orthogonal error 
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terms (Egtf eEpt and EEat) to make each of them one. 
To sum up, through a), b), c) and d), we have determined a 
square matrix G which defines a new vector of error terms Ht: 
(3.116) Ht 
Est 
Eat 
.®Pt . 
and 
(3.117) E[HtHt'] = 
10 0 
0 10 
L 0 0 1 J 
By doing this, we can tell what portion of a forecast error 
is explained by other forecast errors. For example, if 
Var (EEat) 
is big, at is not much affected by st and pt. If 
Var (Eat) 
Var (EEat) . 
is small, at is much affected by St and pt. However, 
Var (Eat) 
the problem with this method is that there are many ways to 
achive the orthogonalization. For example, we can accomplish 
another orthogonalization starting the process mentioned 
above with Eat instead of Est. The orthogonalization process 
described through steps a), b), c) and d) is right only if 
there is a causality order such that a shock in equation of 
St causes a change in equation pt and the change in equation 
Pt causes a change in equation at. A wrong order of 
orthogonalization may cause a strange result in an impulse 
response analysis. 
Finally, the new coefficient of the new error term vector 
Ht is determined as a 3x3 matrix of polynomials in the lag 
operator such that 
(3.118) C(L) • Co + CiL + ••• + CjLi + ... 
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= B(L)G-1. 
Then 
"Est ' "Est " 
(3.119) C(L)Ht = B(L)G-lG Eat = B(L) Eat 
.®Pt . .®pt . 
We call this new coefficient C(L) the 'impulse response 
function.' For example, the responses of the endogenous 
variables (st^ at and pt) at peiod j to a one-standard-error 
shock in the first equation (equation of st) at period 0 are 
in the first column of Cj. The RATS program for this 
procedure is in appendix E. 
3.5.4. Estimation results 
Estimation results of the supply response equation 
The estimated results for the supply response equation 
(3.102) are summarized in Table 4. The estimated value of T 
is 1.04 9 for rice, and 1.043 for wheat. That is, the 
intercept of the supply curve of rice and wheat are moving 
downwards 4.9% and 4.3% every year respectively. 
Using the estimated w we calculate price elasticities. 
The average price elasticity of rice production during 1951-
1980 is 0.144. The average price elasticity of wheat 
production during 1951-1980 is 0.17 9. According to Grant, 
beach and Lin's result (1984), the estimated elasticity of 
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Table 4. Estimation results of supply equation 
Coefficients 
Rice supply equation 
xt = dQt^ + wpt-l 
m=691.799 (418.13)3, 
T=1.049 (0.01), 
do= 31950.883 (6610.68), 
R2=.89 
Rice supply equation 
xt = diTit + tiJipt 
#1=779.717 (425.72), 
Ti=1.050 (0.01), 
di= 30707.921 (6912.83), 
R2=.82 
Rice supply equation 
xt = d2X2  ^ + tiJ2Et-lPt; 
Et-lPt = CO +cipt-l +C2st-1 
+C3et-l +C4lt-l 
#2=10.568 (11.30), 
T2=1.055 (0.02), 
d2= 24893.391 (17907.48), 
R2=.88; 
co= 1935.926 (1.43), 
ci= -0.171 (0.07), 
C2= -0.0001 (0.00007), 
C3= -0.00007 (0.00004), 
C4= 0.018 (0.002), 
R2=.88 
Wheat supply equation 
xt = dQT^ + topt-l 
#=0.048 (0.02), 
T=1.043 (0.01), 
do=.607 (0.11), 
R2=.98 
a. In the () are the standard errors. 
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U.S. rice acreage with respect to lagged farm price was 0.13 
for 1982. 
Comparing the adjusted r2 values in Table 2 and Table 4, 
this supply response equation (3.102) shows reasonably good 
performance in both the case of rice (adjusted R2=0.89) and 
wheat (adjusted r2=0.89) in terms of the adjusted . 
Also, in order to compare explanatory power of the supply 
response equation (3.102) to other supply response model 
specification, we estimate some other supply response 
equations such as: 
(3.120) xt = diTit + TUipt 
(3.121) Xt = + TOr2Et-iPt 
Assume that Et-iPt is determined as an OLS predictor of price 
equation Pt = cq + cipt-i + C2St-i + cget-i + C4lt-i + 
(3.122) Et-iPt = CO + ciPt-i + C2St-i + cget-i + cglt-i 
where St is physical storage, et is net export, It-i is income 
and It is a white noise. As shown in Table 4, Equation 
(3.102) shows reasonably good performance in comparison to 
Equations (120) and (121) . 
Estimation results for the structural parameters 
The estimated results of the rice production are summarized 
in Tables 4, 5 and 6. Considering standard errors of the 
supply equation from the two step method (6610.68 for do and 
0.01 for) in Table 4, there are no big differences between 
Table 4 and 6 in estimated values of do and T, That is, the 
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estimated values of do and x in Table 6 show less than one 
standard error differences from estimated values of do and r 
in Table 5. This reinforces estimation of the supply reponse 
equation by the two step method. In other words, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the results from the one step 
method which is not based on the result from the supply 
response equation (3.102) is not different than the results 
from the two step method which is based on the supply 
response equation (3.102), However, it turns out that P, tp 
and Ô are sensitive to changes in do and r so that they show 
big diffrences between Tables 5 and 6. 
In Table 6, we do not have the estimated value of xn since 
we cannot estimate xu by the one step method. In Table 4, 
wheat estimation results are summarized. In case of wheat, 
only the supply equation is estimated. Since futures market 
for wheat exists during the sample period 1951-1980, so that 
problem (3.50), which does not include futures market 
transactions of wheat, is not appropriate for the wheat 
producer. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain the futures 
market transaction data. 
An interesting result is that, in case of U.S. rice, the 
producer shows almost risk neutral behavior (the largest of 
Table 5 and 6 is 'ip=5.286e-06) . Antle (1987) estimated the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion of Indian rice farmers 
using cross-section data and concluded that the mean of the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion is 3.27. 
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Table 5. Rice estimation results from the two step method 
Lag length 1 2 3 4 
Subjective 0.911 0.953 0.966 0.964 
discount (.001)3 (.001) (6.25e-05) (3.01e-04) 
rate (=P) 
Absolute 5.286e-06 1.034e-06 1.021e-06 1.016e-06 
risk (1.41e-07) (9.62e-09) (8.15e-10) (5.61e-08) 
aversion 
(=tp) 
Storage 0.920 0.935 0.924 0.923 
loss rate (8.40e-04) (3.19e-04) (5.61e-05) (3.63e-04) 
(=0) 
Prob.b 0.25 0.30 .80 0.99 
r9]c [21] [33] [45] 
a. In the () are the standard errors. 
b. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the first order conditions (3.51)-(3.53) hold by the %2 
test. 
c. In the [] are the degree of freedoms. 
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Table 6. Rice estimation results from the one step method 
Lag length 1 2 3 4 
Subjective 0.850 0.852 0.892 0.896 
discount (0.01)3 (0.002) (5.52e-04) (8.16e-04) 
rate (=P) 
Absolute 3.339e-06 1.210e-06 9.881e-07 9.936e-07 
risk (3.97e-07) (2.91e-08) (8.05e-09) (1.66e-07) 
aversion 
(=V) 
Storage 0. 960 0.987 0.955 0. 946 
loss rate (0.004) (6.05e-04) (3.08e-04) (0.028) 
(=0) 
Initial dt 31954.173 32152.325 31522.096 31572.262 
(=do) (303.29) (51.38) (10.73) (351.94) 
Increasing 1.048 1.046 1.049 1.049 
rate of dt (0.002) (2.55e-04) (3.61e-05) (5.24e-04) 
(=T) 
Prob.b 0.07 0.19 0.72 0. 99 
[71° [19] [31] [43] 
a. In the () are the standard errors. 
b. The probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the first order conditions (3.51)-(3.53) hold by the 
test. 
c. In the [] are the degree of freedoms. 
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Using estimated xsj and Ô, we can identify the value of y for 
rice from the equation 
(3.122) tîJ = 7 . 
o 
For example, in case of rice, by the two step method, when 
the lag length is 2 we have m = 691.7 99 and ô = 0.935. Then 
Y=64 6.83. 
After estimating parameters p, ô, and (or P, ô, ip, do and 
X for the one step method), we tested a null hypothesis that 
estimated values of parameters satisfy the first order 
condition (3.58)-(3.60). The probabilities of rejecting the 
null hypothesis by the test are shown in Table 5 and 6. 
In these tables the degrees of freedom is the number of 
overidentifying restrictions used in the instrumental 
variable estimation method. 
Estimation results of the impulse response function 
Using the VAR estimation method we linearly estimated 
Equation (3.85). The VAR estimation results are summarized 
in Table 7. In the equation of physical storage (st), no 
independent variable except gt (^current government physical 
storage) shows significant explanatory power at the 10 
percent level of significance. This backs up the intuition 
that physical storage absorbs unexpected shocks in the 
market. If St is determined by unexpected shocks, the 
variables in the VAR system are not so useful in predicting 
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Table 7. VAR results 
Dependent Variable a(t): adjusted = 0.728885 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.993609 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
1. S (t-1) 0.153010 0.309986 0.49360 
2. p(t-l) -14.744160 278.017383 -0.05303 
3. a(t-l) -0.006602 0.014537 -0.45418 
4. Constant 3473.168711 9488.784633 0.36603 
5. dum(t) -779.846884 4122.415603 -0.18917 
6. d(t) 0.201805 0.226877 0.88949 
7, l(t) -5.558744 11.294602 -0.49216 
8. g(t) 0.368579 0.199043 1.85176 
9. g(t-i) -0.087187 0.129143 -0.67512 
10 . e(t) 0.095300 0.158615 0.60083 
Dependent Variable p(t): adjusted = 0.838252 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 2.106880 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
1. S(t-1) 0.00027863 0.00017087 1.63067 
2. P(t-l) 0.45359359 0.15324692 2.95989 
3. a(t-l) 0.00000111 0.00000801 0.13877 
4. Constant 11.53237755 5.23034553 2.20490 
5. dum(t) 19.87479032 2.27233085 8.74643 
6. d(t) -0.00005525 0.00012506 -0.44182 
7. I (t) 0.00004663 0.00622574 0.00749 
8. g(t) -0.00013341 0.00010971 -1.21597 
9. g(t-l) 0.00002207 0.00007119 0.30998 
10, . e(t) -0.00003579 0.00008743 -0.40937 
Dependent Variable a(t): adjusted R^ = 0.850182 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.978671 
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat 
1. s (t-1) 5.5469 3.9381 1.40852 
2. P(t-l) 11332.6883 3531.9736 3.20860 
3. a(t-l) 0.0429 0.1847 0.23236 
4. Constant 137461.4939 120546.9107 1.14032 
5. dum(t) 373556.3458 52371.7720 7.13278 
6. d(t) -7.6023 2.8823 -2.63759 
7. Kt) 156.5069 143.4883 1.09073 
8. g(t) 5.5235 2.5287 2.18434 
9. g(t-i) -7.4505 1.6407 -4.54121 
10, . e(t) 6.2802 2.0151 3.11663 
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the behavior of st. In Table 8, the results of Granger 
causality tests (Granger, 1969) among the endogenous 
variables are reported. According to Granger, a variable X 
causes a variable Y if Y can be forecasted better using past 
X and past Y than just past Y. Using an F test, we test 
whether inclusion of a variable improves the regression 
result or not. For example, in case of dependent variable 
Pt, the test result in Table 8 shows that st has reasonable 
explanatory power and at has not much explanatory power. 
This means, st Granger-causes pt but at does not. The result 
of causality test indicates that the causal relationship 
among the endogenous variables are st"-*Pt~*at. 
Table 8. Causality test result 
Causality Tests, Dependent Variable s(t) 
Variable 
p(t) 
a (t) 
F-Statistic 
0 . 0 0 2 8  
0.2063 
Sisult 
0.9582591 
0.6548475 
Causality Tests, Dependent Variable p(t) 
Variable 
s (t) 
a (t) 
F-Statistic 
2.6591 
0.0193 
Signif 
0.1194263 
0.8910918 
Causality Tests, Dependent Variable a(t) 
Variable F-Statistic 
1.9839 
10.2951 
Sianif 
s (t) 
P(t) 
0.1751302 
0.0046242 
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The results of the impulse response analysis for the 
decomposition order st-^pt~*at are shown in Figures 12, 13 and 
14. In the figures, the horizontal axes show periods and the 
vertical axes show the amounts of responses in fractions of 
the standard deviations. 
Figure 12 shows that a one-standard-error shock in physical 
storage (=stock) causes immediate negative effects in both 
price and asset. It is natural that rice price falls when 
rice stock increases. Also, rice producers' assets will fall 
when the rice price goes down. 
In Figure 13, a one-standard-error shock in price causes an 
immediate positive response in assets but delayed negative 
response in physical storage. Since, supply of rice is a 
function of lagged price as shown in Equation (3.64) due to 
the time lag in production, the price effect on physical 
storage through production is delayed. 
In Figure 14, a one-standard-error shock in asset causes a 
delayed positive response in price and a delayed negative 
response in physical storage. In our model introduced in 
Section 3.4.2, a composite good is used as an asset as well 
as a production input. Hence, in order to increase the 
amount of asset we have to decrease the amount of composite 
good used as production input. In other words, if rice 
producers use their resources in buying the asset, they have 
to decrease production. Then the decrease in rice production 
leads an increase in rice price. But, due to the production 
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Figure 12. Impulse responses to a shock in physical 
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Figure 13. Impulse responses to a shock in price 
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Figure 14. Impulse responses to a shock in asset 
lag, there is a lag between the increase in asset and the 
increase in price. By the same way, an increase in rice 
producers' asset causes a delayed decrease in rice production 
and the delayed decrease in rice production causes a delayed 
decrease rice stock. 
Both in Figure 13 and 14, responses of rice stock explained 
by shocks in price and asset respectively are less than 10 
percent of their standards errors. On the other hand, in 
Figure 12, responses of price and asset to a shock in stock 
account for about 60 percent of their standard variations. 
That is, st Granger-causes pt and at. 
I 
stock — 
Pricc 
1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 r 
0 2 4 6 8 
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So far we have discussed two empirical results: i) rice 
stock (st) is affected by elements other than variables in 
the VAR system; ii) rice stock Granger-causes price and asset 
holdings. To sum up, the rice stock works as a buffer which 
absorbs unexpected shocks and dissipates those shocks into 
prices and assets. If we combine these results with the 
ealier theoretical result that storage separates production 
from risk, we can conclude that rice stocks (st) insulate 
production from risk. 
3.6. Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed dynamic supply response 
models with risk. In Section 3.2 we reviewed a variety of 
supply response models. The reviewed models have two 
shortcomings: i) it is assumed that all parameters are 
invariable to change of risk distribution; ii) the models do 
not allow a means through which the producer can spread risk. 
In Section 3.3 we built a rational expectations model with 
demand side risk to show that the parameters of the supply 
curve are not invariable to the policy change. With the 
^risk structure' built in, a rational expectations model is 
difficult to estimate if we do not know the distribution of 
risk. It is because the stabilization policy changes the 
distribution of risk and the change in the distribution of 
risk changes the parameters of the model. Hence we need to 
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estimate deep parameters which are independent of change of 
policy or distribution of risk. 
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5 we built and estimated a supply 
response model which has price risk. In the model, we showed 
that it is possible to obtain a separation result using 
storage. The model has two storage instruments (financial 
assets and physical inventory). When changing the level of 
production against risk is more difficult than changing the 
level of storage against risk, the producer separates the 
production decision from risk and negotiates risk with two 
storage instruments. Because of the separation result which 
separates the production from risk, the production technology 
is easily estimated in spite of risk. 
After the production technology is estimated, using these 
estimated parameters we estimate other structural parameters 
of the model. Among various methods developed for structural 
parameter estimation of a non-linear rational expectations 
model, we choose Hansen and Singleton's method. It is 
because: i) since it uses the GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments) estimator, it does not depends on the choice of the 
distribution; ii) since it uses the instrumental variable 
method, it does not require explicit form solutions for 
choice variables. 
In order to reinforce the results from the separation 
result, we include two empirical studies. 
First, we estimate do, t, P, Ô and tp all together using the 
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instrumental variables method. In the estimation, we use the 
values of do and t estimated in the supply response equation 
(3.102) as initial values for do and x respectively. The 
values of do and t estimated by this method are within one 
standard error deviation from the values of do and t estimated 
in the supply response equation (3.102). This reinforces the 
supply response equation (3.102), since the two methods based 
on the sparation result show almost the same results. 
Second, we estimate the impulse responses of the endogenous 
variables of the model (physical storage, asset, price). The 
result indicate that physical storage works as a buffer which 
insulates production from risk. 
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4. SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
If we understand that a price stabilization policy is a 
government's attempt to restore the equilibrium when the 
market fails, we need a structural equilibrium model by which 
the market can be judged if it could lead its utility 
maximizing agents to that equilibrium or not. We need the 
model to be dynamic as well as structural since some 
structures are inherently dynamic. When a market is judged a 
failure we need a government stabilization policy which is 
based on the dynamic structural model. Using the structural 
model the government can predict the producer's response to 
the policy so that the government can make a correct 
prescription for the economy. 
In Chapter 2, we criticize the WOM model by introducing 
dynamics in the model. In Section 2.1 and 2.2, we reviewed 
and criticized the Waugh-Oi-Massell model in which there is 
no time lag in production, no risk, and linear utility. In 
that case, the price stabilization policy has two different 
effects on the producer's side. First, the policy gets rid 
of advantages from its production flexibility. If a producer 
has enough production flexibility to adjust its production 
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amount to price change, the producer usually prefers the 
price change. Second, the policy reallocates the producer's 
income over time. However, in this case, the reallocation 
does not effects the producer's utility since the lES is 
infinite. In other words, since the economy is already at 
its equilibrium there is nothing to gain from the 
stabilization policy. 
We also reviewed the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model which 
is the same as the Waugh-Oi-Massell model except the lES is 
less than infinity. In the Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz model, 
since the IBS is less than infinity, the producer can gain 
from a stabilization policy if he/she has no means for 
intertemporal resource allocation. For example, using a 
buffer stock policy, a government can achieve the dynamic 
intertemporal equilibrium. However, if we allow a means for 
intertemporal resource allocation to the producer, the 
producer's optimizing behavior makes the economy return to 
its dynamic intertemporal equilibrium. In that case, since 
the economy can achieve the dynamic intertemporal equilibrium 
on its own, stabilization policy is of no use. 
In Section 2.4 we suggested a model in which not 
only intertemporal resource allocation is possible but also 
risk attitudes and intertemporal substitutability are 
separately included. In the model we can distinguish two 
different effects of a stabilization policy the effects of 
risk elimination and the effects of income smoothing. The 
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model is a better representation of reality than the Waugh-
Oi-Massell model or Turnovsky-Shalit-Schmitz models. It is 
because: i) in the model, we can distinguish two different 
effects of a stabilization policy the effects of risk 
elimination and the effects of income smoothing; ii) we can 
understand how the producer can achieve a dynamic 
intertemporal equilibrium through intertemporal resource 
allocation. 
Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of dynamic instruments 
such as storage in a supply response model. In Chapter 3, 
using storage instead of futures market, we investigated the 
possibility of extending the separation result to commodities 
which are not traded in the futures market. 
In Section 3.2, we discussed results and shortcomings of 
conventional supply response models. Following Sandmo's 
result (Sandmo, 1971) which says that risk reduces 
production, many agricultural economists tried to incorporate 
risk in the supply equation. However, the conventional 
supply response models have two shortcomings: a) it is 
assumed that all parameters are invariable to change of risk 
distribution; b) the models do not allow a means through 
which the producer can spread risk. 
In Section 3.3 a dynamic rational expectations model with 
price risk is discussed. In this case, the parameters of the 
supply curve change due to the producer's response to the 
stabilization policy. In Section 3,4 we extended the 
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rational expectations model from Section 3.3 by including 
instruments for storage, futures trading and intertemporal 
resource allocation. In the supply response equation (3.64) 
the parameters are invariable to the stabilization policy 
since, using storage and futures markets, the producer is 
able to separate the production decision from risk. Hence, 
the problems a) and b) are solved by introducing dynamics 
(storage) into the model. 
Although it is well known that we can derive the same 
separation result using futures market, empirical studies for 
separation results caused by futures markets are not included 
in this study because of difficulties in obtaining futures 
transaction data. 
In Section 3.5, using the separation result, we estimated 
the supply response equation (3.64) and other stuructural 
parameters. Important results from the estimations are: i) 
the average elasticity of supply with respect to lagged price 
during 1951-1980 was 0.144 for U.S. rice and 0.179 for U.S. 
wheat; ii) the intercept of the supply curve of rice and 
wheat are moving downwards 4.9% and 4.3% every year 
respectively; iii) U.S. rice producers show almost risk 
neutral behavior (the largest of the estimated values is 
ip=5.286e-06) . 
In this thesis, using dynamic models, we have criticized 
conventional static price stabilization models. Since 
dynamic instruments such as physical storage and financial 
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assets are most powerful means for producers to stabili 
their price or income, we cannot understand producers' 
behavior against instability without these instruments. 
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APPENDIX A. THE TSS MODEL FOR CONSUMERS 
Let us begin with deriving a indirect utility function 
from a utility maximization problem such as 
(A.l) 2 U(xt,yt) 
t=0 
s.t. Ptxt + QtYt = Ht 
where U(-) is a utility function, xt is period t consumption 
of the good in which we are interested, yt is period t 
consumption of all other goods, Pt and Qt are the prices of 
the goods. Ht is the income. Let us assume Ft, Qt and Ht are 
given exogenously. Note that we assumed a time-separable 
utility function which has the same form every period. 
If we use Qt as a price index and define Pt = ^  and 
It = ^  we can denote the consumer's problem in real terms 
such as 
(A.2) 2 U(xt,yt) 
t=0 
s.t. ptxt + yt = I-
Assume that pt is the only random variable which is 
stationary and known to consumers before they make 
consumption decision. The source of randomness of Ft is 
random shift of the supply curve. Note that we assumed 
It = I for all t and dropped the time subscript. Solving the 
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problem we can derive the demand function such as 
(A.3) xg = Xd(pt,l). 
Then the indirect utility function is 
(A.4) vt = V(pt,I). 
If dispersion of pt around its mean value p® is small enough, 
using the mean-variance analysis based on Taylor expansion, 
we can approximate the agent's indirect utility such as 
(A.5) V(pk,I) ~ V(pe,i) + Vp(pe,I) • (Pt-P®) 
+ 2 I)•(Pt-PG)2. 
Using this approximation, we can calculate the amount of 
price increase which the agent is willing to pay to make pt 
be stabilized at p"^ (Pratt, 1964; Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981) . If we define W be the amount, we have 
(A.6) EV(pt,I) = V(pd+W,I). 
Note that we call V(pd+w,I) a certainty equivalent of 
EV(pt,I). If we expand LHS of (A.6) around p® by first order 
Taylor expansion, 
(A.7) V(pd+W, I) - V(pe,l) + Vp(pe,I) - (pd+W-pS) 
From (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7), 
(A.8) W = (pG-pd) - J q)'Op2 
where cp = - , and Op^ is the variance of the price. 
Vp(p®,I) ^ 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) call (pe-pd) the transfer benefit, 
- J (p'Op^ the risk benefit. 
Now, if the government stabilize the price at p® the 
consumer will lose (gain) from the stabilization when 
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Vpp >(<) 0. Figure A.l shows the case in which Vp < 0, 
Vpp > 0, and Prob(pi) = Prob(p2) = .5. 
Figure A.l. Jensen's inequality 
Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz (1980) derived a more 
meaningful form of Vpp such as 
(A. 9) Vpp = ^  x-Vj • (sTi-sp+e) 
where s is the budget share of xt, ri is the income elasticity 
at p®, p is the relative risk aversion at p®, e is the price 
elasticity of demand at p®.^0 
10. Mathematically, 
s = J (= The share of expenditure for x) 
T| = ~ ~ (= The income elasticity of demand for x) 
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Using (A.9) and Roy's identity, 
(A 10) HcaiPMI . . <sn-sp+e) 
Vp(pe,I) ps 
Hence the willingness to pay for the stabilization policy is 
(A.n, 
Unless the coefficient of relative risk aversion (=p) is very 
large, W is negative so that the consumer lose from the 
stabilization. Furthermore, if t] = p or s - 0/ this model 
degenerate to the WOM model in which the price elasticity is 
the only thing which could determine W. Also, if T] = p, we 
can use consumer's surplus in the place of the indirect 
utility function.11 On the other hand, if the price is 
determined after the consumer's decision is made, the price 
a^v 
ai2 " ^ 
p = - — (= The income elasticity of the marginal 
d l  
utility of 
income,i.e. coefficient of relative risk 
aversion) 
e = - ^ (= The price elasticity of demand for x) 
Since Roy's identity is we can use consumer 
surplus as a measure of consumer welfare when =0. It is 
o l o p  
because the right hand side of the equation 
P2 1 av 
; * dp = f  ^ dp 
pi pi 
is a monotonie transformation of AV caused by Ap and left 
hand side of the equation is the change of consumer surplus. 
Further, we get T] = ^ + p by differentiating 
both sides of Roy's identity with respect to income. Then we 
a^v know ri = p Iff = 0. 
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elasticity would be zero. In that case, if r ]  > { < )  p ,  the 
consumer lose (gain) from the stabilization policy. 
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APPENDIX B. THE CRRA AND THE IBS 
(B.l) V(Ci,C2,...fC?) = u(ct) 
Consider a dynamic optimization problem with an additively 
separable utility function such as 
Max. 
 tc c  T;
t=l 
s.t. r(ci,ci+i) = 0, for i=l,2,...T-l 
where V(•) is the utility function, r(*) is a constraint, ct 
is a consumption at period t. From the first order condition 
and the constraint we know 
(B.2) , a±i , . 
u'(ct) Act+1 
where rt=(5r/8ct) . 
Now because of the additive separability of the utility 
function we can define the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (*8) such as 
(B,3) e 
u (ct) £t±i 
u'(ct+i) 
Since total differentials of and , ^ are respectively 
Ct u'(ct+i) 
A ct+1 Act+I-Ct - Ct+I-Act 
(B.4) A Ct = ct2 
and 
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. u'(ct) u" (ct)'Acf u'(ct+i) - u'(ct) •u"(ct+i)-Act+i (B.5) A — = : : 
u (ct+i) {u (ct+i) 
we can rewrite (B.3) such as 
u' (ct) 
(B.6) e = -
'Ct + Ct+1 
u"(ct) u"(ct+i) u'(ct) 
u'(ct) 
Hence, if CRRA ("p) is a constant such that 
/n J, u"(ct) u"(ct+i) 
we can conclude 
1 
P 
(B.8) 0 = - . 
134 
APPENDIX C. THE CHANGE OF UTILITY 
Assuming a CARA utility function such as 
(C.l) U(ct) = -exp[-ijjct] 
= -exp[-n){ptxt-(l+i) V(xt) }] 
where ip is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. If we 
assume normality of one-period-ahead conditional distribution 
of the price such that Pt~N(Et-iPtf/ the expected utility 
is 
(C.2) Et-iU(ct) 
+00 
= - fexp [-H){ptXt-(l+i) V(xt) }]exp[-(Pt 
OpVijt J 20p^ 
—00 
Following Baron (1970), complete the square in the exponent 
and integrate. Then we obtain 
(C.3) Et-iU(ct) = -exp[-i|){Et-iPtXt-(l+i)V(xt) 
-^Op2 (xt) 2} ] . 
Since we know the log transformation does not change 
preference ordering, take log on both sides of (C.3), 
(C.4) log[Et-iU(ct) ] = ii){Et-iPtXt-(l+i)V(xt)-^Op2(xt)2} . 
Clearly, the maximization of (C.3) is equivalent to the 
maximization of (C.4) and the first order condition for (C.4) 
is 
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(C.5) Et-iPt - (l+i)V'(xt®) - llJOp2xt® = 0 
where xt® is the value of xt which satisfy the first order 
condition. 
On the other hand, if we stabilize the price at pt*, the 
utility is 
(C.6) U(ct*) = -exp[-ii){pt*.xt-(l+i)V(xt) }] . 
Taking log on both sides, 
(C.7) log[U(ct*)] = ii){pt*.xt-(l + i)V(xt) } . 
The first order condition for (C.7) is 
(C.8) Et-iPt - (l+i)V'(xt*) = 0 
where xt* is the value of xt which satisfy the first order 
condition. 
Then the producer's gain (=Gp) from the stabilization 
policy is 
(C.9) Gp = il)[{pt*.xt*-(l+i)V(xt*) } 
- {Et-iPtXt®- ( 1+i ) V ( Xt® ) -^ap2 ( Xt® ) 2} ] 
= ^ [{Pt*-Xt*-Et-lP{:Xt®} + { (l+i)V(xt®)-(l+i)V(xt*) } 
+ {^Op2 (Xt®)2}] . 
In Figure C.l, {pt*'Xt*-Et-iPtxt®} = {area (cxt*xt®b)-
area (abpt*Et-iPt) If ( (1+i) V (xt®) - (1+i) V(xt*) } = {area (cxt*xt®e) }, 
1 1 {^Op2 (xt®) 2} = {-area (aefEt-iPt) ) . Hence, 
(C.IO) Gp = ip [ {area (cxt*xt®b)-area (abpt*Et-iPt) } 
-{area (cxt*xt®e) } + {^area (aefEt-iPt) } ] 
= ^  [area (cdfpt*) -area (abpt*Et-iPt) ] • 
Changing the unit of the utility by multiplying RHS of (C.IO) 
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by —, we obtain 
(C.ll) Gp = area (cdfpt*)-area (abpt*Et-iPt) 
= {waved area}-{dotted area}. 
(l+i)v(xt)+4'0^x 
Figure C.l. The producer's gain from the stabilization policy 
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APPENDIX D. THE WHEAT DATA 
T a b l e  D . 1 .  T h e  w h e a t  d a t a  
Real 
Year Price^ Private Government Demand^ Produc- Domestic 
( 1 9 8 2 - 8 4 $ )  Stock^ Stock^ tion^) Demand^ 
1 9 5 1  7 . 6 7  0 . 3 3 1 5  0 . 1 6 0 2  1 . 1 8 0 1  0 . 9 8 8 2  0 . 6 9 4 6  
1 9 5 2  7 . 9 1  0 . 2 4 7 4  0 . 0 8 2 3  0 . 9 8 7 6  1 . 3 0 6 4  0 . 6 5 5 6  
1 9 5 3  7 . 7 8  0 . 3 8 0 4  0 . 2 9 1 8  0 . 8 5 7 3  1 . 1 7 3 1  0 . 6 4 3 7  
1 9 5 4  7 . 5 6  0 . 2 7 9 3  0 . 7 1 4 3  0 . 8 7 1 9  0 . 9 8 3 9  0 . 6 0 4 7  
1 9 5 5  7 . 8 8  0 . 1 3 8 8  0 . 9 7 0 6  0 . 9 2 6 1  0 . 9 3 7 1  0 . 6 0 3 9  
1 9 5 6  7 . 2 5  0 . 2 0 8 6  0 . 9 2 1 6  1 . 1 3 9 6  1 . 0 0 5 4  0 . 5 9 8 6  
1 9 5 7  6 . 9 7  0 . 1 9 5 7  0 . 8 0 8 3  1 . 0 0 8 2  0 . 9 5 5 7  0 . 5 8 9 7  
1 9 5 8  6 . 6 5  0 . 1 4 9 3  0 . 8 1 2 9  1 . 0 5 9 9  1 . 4 5 7 4  0 . 6 1 0 3  
1 9 5 9  5 . 9 8  0 . 2 8 4 3  1 . 0 8 3 8  1 . 1 0 8 7  1 . 1 1 7 7  0 . 6 0 6 9  
1 9 6 0  5 , 9 2  0 . 1 8 6 2  1 . 1 9 8 0  1 . 2 4 4 5  1 . 3 5 4 7  0 . 5 9 1 0  
1 9 6 1  5 . 8 0  0 . 2 7 7 8  1 . 2 2 4 6  1 . 3 2 0 1  1 . 2 3 2 4  0 . 6 0 4 4  
1 9 6 2  6 , 0 4  0 . 3 4 6 2  1 . 0 7 4 4  1 . 2 4 8 2  1 . 0 9 2 0  0 . 5 9 8 8  
1 9 6 3  6 . 6 4  0 . 1 6 7 9  1 . 1 0 1 8  1 . 4 2 7 1  1 . 1 4 6 8  0 . 5 8 1 5  
1 9 6 4  5 . 9 4  0 . 1 9 3 7  0 . 7 9 9 8  1 . 3 5 7 6  1 . 2 8 3 4  0 . 6 3 4 9  
1 9 6 5  4 . 3 3  0 . 2 8 6 3  0 . 6 3 4 8  1 . 5 7 7 1  1 . 3 1 5 6  0 . 7 2 5 3  
1 9 6 6  4 . 1 5  0 . 3 6 1 3  0 . 2 9 9 2  1 . 4 5 4 4  1 . 3 0 4 9  0 . 6 8 3 1  
1 9 6 7  4 . 8 6  0 . 3 9 0 8  0 . 1 2 2 0  1 . 3 9 1 1  1 . 5 0 7 6  0 . 6 2 5 8  
1 9 6 8  3 . 9 8  0 . 5 3 0 1  0 . 1 0 0 1  1 . 2 8 3 9  1 . 5 5 6 6  0 . 7 3 9 7  
1 9 6 9  3 . 3 7  0 . 7 6 4 5  0 . 1 3 9 5  1 . 3 6 7 0  1 . 4 4 2 7  0 . 7 6 4 0  
1 9 7 0  3 . 2 1  0 . 7 0 5 4  0 . 2 7 7 2  1 . 5 1 2 9  1 . 3 5 1 6  0 . 7 7 2 1  
1 9 7 1  3 . 2 7  0 . 4 7 0 2  0 . 3 5 2 6  1 . 4 5 9 1  1 . 6 1 8 6  0 . 8 4 9 3  
1 9 7 2  3 . 1 9  0 . 6 2 8 3  0 . 3 5 5 1  1 . 9 3 3 8  1 . 5 4 6 2  0 . 7 9 8 7  
1 9 7 3  3 . 9 5  0 . 5 9 0 8  0 . 0 0 6 3  1 . 9 7 0 4  1 . 7 1 0 8  0 . 7 5 3 4  
1 9 7 4  7 . 9 8  0 . 3 3 9 5  0 . 0 0 0 6  1 . 6 9 0 4  1 . 7 8 1 9  0 . 6 7 1 9  
1 9 7 5  2 . 0 2  0 . 4 3 5 0  0 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 8 9 8 7  2 . 1 2 6 9  0 . 7 2 5 8  
1 9 7 6  6 . 2 3  0 . 6 6 5 6  0 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 7 0 3 9  2 . 1 4 8 8  0 . 7 5 4 4  
1 9 7 7  4 . 4 9  1 . 1 1 3 2  0 . 0 0 0 0  1 . 9 8 2 8  2 . 0 4 5 5  0 . 8 5 9 0  
1 9 7 8  3 . 5 6  1 . 1 2 9 5  0 . 0 4 8 3  2 . 0 3 1 1  1 . 7 7 5 5  0 . 8 3 7 0  
1 9 7 9  4 . 0 9  0 . 8 7 3 0  0 . 0 5 1 1  2 . 1 5 8 3  2 . 1 3 4 1  0 . 7 8 3 1  
1 9 8 0  4 . 5 9  0 . 7 1 4 2  0 . 1 8 7 8  2 . 2 9 6 3  2 . 3 8 0 9  0 . 7 8 2 5  
a. Price per bushel. 
b. In billion bushel. 
c. In base years (1982-84) billion dollar. 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
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T a b l e  D . l .  ( c o n t i n u e d )  
Consumer 
Real Real Current Price Real 
Export'^ Interest Financial Priced Index Income'^ 
Rate Assets'^ (Current$) (1982- (1982-84$) 
(%) (1982-84$) 84=100) 
0.4855 -3.9 3.45 2.00 26.0 1328.2 
0.3320 2.0 4,59 2.11 26.6 1380.0 
0.2136 3.4 4,22 2.09 26.8 1435.0 
0.2672 3.7 3.87 2.04 26.9 1416.2 
0.3222 4.5 3.63 2.12 26.8 1494.9 
0.5410 2.8 3.76 1.98 27.2 1525.6 
0.4185 1.7 3.41 1.97 28.1 1551.1 
0.4496 2.5 4.17 1.93 28.9 1539.2 
0.5018 4.7 3.42 1.75 29.1 1629.1 
0.6535 4.4 3.80 1.76 29.6 1665.3 
0.7157 4.6 3.29 1.74 29.9 1708.7 
0.6494 4.6 3.23 1.83 30.2 1799.4 
0.8456 4.3 3.04 2,04 30.6 1878.3 
0.7227 4.3 2.51 1,85 31.0 1973.3 
0.8518 4.0 2.44 1,37 31.5 2087.6 
0.7713 3.0 2.58 1.35 32.4 2208.3 
0.7653 2.9 2.55 1.63 33.4 2271.4 
0.5442 2,7 2.26 1.39 34.8 2365.6 
0.6030 2,4 1,91 1.24 36.7 2423.3 
0.7408 3.0 1.80 1.25 38.8 2416.2 
0.6098 3,5 2.11 1.33 40,5 2484.8 
1.1351 4.2 2.36 1.34 41.8 2608.5 
1.2170 1.3 4.39 1.76 44.4 2744.1 
1.0185 -2.9 4.47 3.95 49.3 2729,3 
1.1729 -0.4 3.99 1.09 53.8 2695.0 
0.9495 2.9 3.05 3.56 56,9 2826.7 
1.1238 1.9 2.27 2.73 60,6 2958.6 
1.1941 0.8 2.10 2.33 65,2 3115.2 
1.3752 -2,2 2.59 2.98 72.6 3192.4 
1.5138 -3.1 2.80 3.80 82.4 3187.1 
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APPENDIX B. THE RATS PROGRAMS FOR RICE ESTIMATIONS 
E.l, Two Step Method 
************************** pROGRAM ************************* 
ALL 0 30 
OPEN DATA rr2 
DATA(FORMAT=FREE,ORG=OBS) / year rp rl ps gs dem pro gnp cpi int p 1 ex 
SET inc = gnp*1000000 
SET a = fa*1000000 
**** 
NONLIN dO tau ohm 
SET trend = T 
SET const = 1 
COMPUTE d0=0 
COMPUTE tau=1.03 
COMPUTE ohm=0 
FRML tech = dO*tau**trend{1)+ohm*rp{1} 
NLLS(FRML=tech, ITERATION=100) pro 
* * * * 
COMPUTE r=.032 
SET trend = T 
SET d = dO*tau**(trend-1) 
NONLIN ara bet del 
FRML hx = EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2*d*pro)*.5/ $ 
(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps{l)-rp*ps+(1+r)*a{l}-a))* $ 
(rp-(1+r)*(pro-d)/(del*ohm)) 
FRML hs = bet*del*EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2*d*pro)*.5/ $ 
(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps{1}-rp*ps+(1+r)*a{1)-a))*rp- $ 
EXP(-ara*(rp{1)*pro{1}-(1+r)*(pro{1)**2-2*d{1)*pro{11)* $ 
.5/(del*ohm)+rp{1)*del*ps{2}-rp{1}*ps+(1+r)*a{2)-a{1}))*rp{1} 
FRML ha = bet*(1+r)*EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2*d*pro)*.5/ $ 
(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps(1}-rp*ps+(1+r)*a{1}-a))- $ 
EXP(-ara*(rp{1)*pro{1}-(1+r)*(pro{1}**2-2*d{ 1}*pro{1))* $ 
.5/(del*ohm)+rp{1)*del*ps{2}-rp{1}*ps+(1+r)*a{2)-a(1})) 
COMPUTE init = 1 
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DOFOR nlag =12 3 4 
INSTRUMENTS pro{init TO nlag} rpfinit TO nlag} $ 
ps{init+l TO nlag+1) a(init+l TO nlag+1} 
COMPUTE ara=0 
COMPUTE bet=.95 
COMPUTE del=.93 
NLSYSTEM(INSTRUMENTS, ZUDEP, 1TERATIONS=1500) / hx hs ha 
CDF CHISQR %UZWZU 12*nlag-3 
END DOFOR 
B.2. One Step Method 
************************** PROGRAM ************************* 
ALL 0 30 
OPEN DATA rr2 
DATA(FORMAT=FREE,ORG=OBS) / year rp rl ps gs dem pro gnp cpi int p 1 ex fa 
SET inc = gnp*1000000 
SET a = fa*1000000 
* * * * 
NONLIN dO tau ohm 
SET trend = T 
SET const = 1 
COMPUTE d0=0 
COMPUTE tau=1.03 
COMPUTE ohm=0 
FRML tech = dO*tau**trend{1}+ohm*rp{1) 
NLLS(FRML=tech, ITERATION=100) pro 
**** 
COMPUTE r=.032 
SET trend = T 
SET d = dO*tau**(trend-1) 
NONLIN ara bet del dO tau 
FRML hx = EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2*(dO*tau**trend{l})*pro)*.5/ $ 
(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps{1}-rp*ps+(1+r)*a{1}-a))* $ 
(rp-(1+r)*(pro-(dO*tau**trend{1)))/(del*ohm)) 
FRML hs = bet*del*EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2* $ 
(dO*tau**trend{1})*pro)*.5/ $ 
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(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps(l}-rp*ps+(1+r)*a{l}-a))*rp- $ 
EXP(-ara*(rp{1}*pro{1)-(1+r)*(pro(1)**2-2* $ 
(dO*tau**trend(2})*pro{l} ) * $ 
.5/(del*ohm)+rp{1)*del*ps{2}-rp{1}*ps+(1+r)*a{2)-a(1)))*rp{1} 
FRML ha = bet*(1+r)*EXP(-ara*(rp*pro-(1+r)*(pro**2-2* $ 
(dO*tau**trend{l})*pro)*.5/ $ 
(del*ohm)+rp*del*ps{1)-rp*p3+(1+r)*a{1}-a))- $ 
BXP(-ara*(rp(l)*pro(l)-(i+r)*(pro(l)**2-2* $ 
(dO*tau**trend{2})*pro{l))* $ 
.5/(del*ohm)+rp{l}*del*p3(2)-rp{l)*ps+{l+r)*a{2}-all)) ) 
COMPUTE init = 1 
DOFOR nlag =12 3 4 
INSTRUMENTS pro{init TO nlag} rp(init TO nlag} $ 
p3{init+l TO nlag+1) a{init+l TO nlag+1} 
COMPUTE ara=0 
COMPUTE bet=.9 
COMPUTE del=.93 
COMPUTE d0=31950 
COMPUTE tau=1.0488 
NLSYSTEM(INSTRUMENTS, ZUDEP, ITERATIONS=1500) / hx ha hs 
CDF CHISQR %UZWZU 12*nlag-5 
END DOFOR 
E.3. Impulse Response Estimation 
************************** PROGRAM ************************* 
ALL 0 30 
OPEN DATA rr4 
DATA(FORMAT=FREE,ORG=OBS) / year rp rl ps gs dem pro gnp cpi int p 1 ex 
fa pt rv 
COMPUTE dO = 31950.883 
COMPUTE tau = 1.049 
SET dom = dem-ex 
SET trend = T 
SET d = dO*tau**(trend-1) 
SET inc = gnp*1000000 
SET a = fa*1000000 
SET dum = T>=23.AND.T<=23 
COMPUTE nlags = 2 
COMPUTE neqn = 3 
142 
COMPUTE nateps =20 
SYSTEM 1 TO neqn 
VARIABLES ps rp a 
DETERM CONSTANT dum d gnp gs gs{l} ex 
LAGS 1 TO nlags 
END(SYSTEM) 
ESTIMATE(OUTSIGMA=V) 
LIST keqn =12 3 
ERRORS neqn 8 V 
CARDS keqn * * keqn 
DECLARE RECT[SERIES] 
DECLARE VECT[SERIES] 
DECLARE VECT[LABELS] 
INPUT IMPLABEL 
Stock Price Asset 
LIST lEQN = 1 TO NEQN 
SMPL 1 NSTEPS 
DO 1=1,NEQN 
IMPULSE(PRINT) NEQN NSTEPS I V 
CARDS lEQN IMPBLK(IEQN,I) 1 lEQN 
DISPLAY(STORE=HEADER) 'Plot of Responses To' IMPLABEL (I) 
DO J=1,NEQN 
SET SCALED(J) = (IMPBLK(J,I))/SQRT(V(J,J) ) 
LABELS SCALED(J) 
# IMPLABEL(J) 
END DO J 
GRAPH(HEADER=HEADER,KEY=UPRIGHT,NUMBER=0,WIDTH=8,HEIGHT=5,PATTERNS) 
NEQN 
CARDS SCALED(lEQN) 
END DO I 
DO 1=1,NEQN 
DISPLAY(STORE=HEADER) 'Plot of Responses of IMPLABEL(I) 
DO J=1,NEQN 
LABELS IMPBLK(I,J) 
# IMPLABEL(J) 
END DO J 
GRAPH(HEADER=HEADER,KEY=UPRIGHT,NUMBER=0, WIDTH=8, HEIGHT=5,PATTERNS) 
NEQN 
CARDS IMPBLK(I,IEQN) 
END DO I 
IMPBLK(NEQN,NEQN) 
SCALED(NEQN) 
IMPLABEL(NEQN) 
